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CHAP'l'R.R I 
IN'l'RODUCTI ON 
Di sappointment in the effectiveness of the United 
Nations inspired the United States and its prospective 
partners to negotiate the North Atlgntic Pact . 
One thins is certoin , Bnd this is thBt the Pl':\.ct would 
never have been conceived and si ned had it not been for 
ussia 1 s persistent ~md unrnmi tting aP'P"ression and hostili t"~ 
since 1 :ialta . 
On April 4 , 1949 the oleni~ otentiaries of t11elve nation! 
I 
si rnRd the North Atlantic Pact in WAqhington and a nev 
ional cluster of stRtPs came closer to reelization . It 
t different things to ea ch of tha concePned states . It 
ris .oric occasion pregnant with unpredil"'table 
possibilities . 
~or the United States it meant a bold new stap toward 
new and vqst re non~ibilities . For E1rooeans , it meont th~t 
they were no lon~er stronp Anou~h to mediate het7ePn Russi 0 
1 I!I11r0uis W, Childs , n·vF~shington and the AtlAntic PP,..t , ' 
{qle Revie , No . 4, June, 1949 , p . 577 . 
I 
the es~enti~l need of an Ame~icsn militqry ,u r ntee. Bor 
lorway and Derurnrk it meRnt the difficult deci!'lion to trode 
Scnndinavian unity and an old but weakened tradition of 
neutrality for an undefined ~essure of p~otection . For all, 
it underlined the gigantic, savn e demands of modern warfare 
which could turn an area, sprawling over ten thousand niles 
from Italy to Alaska and from the North Pole to the Tropic of 
Cancer, into a 11 rPgion" capable of subjection to a cortll"l.on 
threat. 
IImportanc~!_E~udy . 
It is a ve-r>y difficult task to say what this alliance 
will .finf'llly mean because it "~nil1 chanp;e with ex.nArience and 
circumstances . At this sta e this ~iant is still in the 
process of being nourished and in the dormant stq -e. However, 
it vTill have 2 distinct influence in the civilization in 
general and to its signatories in pRrticular . il_lhe nations 
which have adopted the F.o.ct will have to sacrifice their 
additional national mt=>npower, resources and wealth . It may 
create an international peace or ~ar, who c~n ans:er? Only 
time will tell . 
It is certain that the Pact has already contributed 
greatly to the cooperation and undp.rgtanding among nations 
which is so vital in this present day vorld rith its p oblems . 
1'he North A tl nti c .Pact would mean the sharinp of 
2. 
ll 
technological pro"'·re s amonp the n~1 tions which is impnrt"'nt in 
dev"3loping the stand rds of 1 i..ving of thP entire V'orld . 
The Pact ha~ significantly contributed psrcholo~ical 
and moral f'dvantages among the 11 freP 11 peoples of the -rorld 
"nd those living behind the "Iron Curt-in ." Above all , it is 
a check on ag ression . 
The above contributions a~e of utmost val ue in ordPr to 
ave peace in the wor l d . Therefore , any plan or alliance that 
contributes toward the peace is ~ service to mankind and is 
~orth studying and seeing that i t bears fruit . 2 
Some Features of the North Atl .... ntic Pact: 
Some of the dtstinctive featurAS of the TrAFty n e as 
follo'Js : 3 
1 . It i s under the Charter of the United Nntions. 
2 . Its main purpose is defen8e . 
3 . It orovides cooperation in political, economical 
and military fields . 
4 . An attack on one or More parties of the P~ct is to 
be considered an attack on all o f the members . 
j 2secret.-:.ry of State Dean Acheson, 11 The Underlying 
I'urpose in Atl Antic Defense ," The Christian Science llonitor , 
( tioston ) Second Section , May 31, 1950 . 
3Department of St te 3ul 1Ati n , March ~7 , 1949 , pp . l - 5 . 
~lso Public~tl on 34o2 , Department of Stnte . 
3 . 
5 . It aoplies to the North Atl~ntic grea and its 
influence apDroaches to North of the Tropic of Cancer . 
6 . ~he Treaty is to be revi ed at the end of ten years 
a nd any r.tember c~n wi thdr 8w ., t the end of t 1nenty years by 
giving a years ' notice . 
Aim of the Thesis : 
The ~rimqry aim of the student here ·ill be to consider. 
the North Atlanti c .Pact from the point of view of a milit<>ry 
alli::mce and its place i n the power "Doli tics in the United 
Nations . 
I 
I ethods : ,__
'l'here are not many books yet written on the subject 
•p rimc rily due to the newness of the Pact . However , all 
I • 1po3s1ble documents from the Department of State on 
. I 
the subJect 
matter were secured and further sources vere t aken from 
periodicals and newspapers . 
4 . 
I 
CHA 'l'ER II 
DEV""LO 1ffiN'l'S IN UHI'l'BD S'l'A'IBS FOREIGN rOLICY 
I Isolationist ideas which h ve tradi.ti.onally 
!ch r"ctet·ized American ~orei-n Policy until very lately have 
now been relinauished. There can be everal fcctors for such 
a chan~e, however the ollowinp reasons re ba ic . 
1 . 
In the First World ~ar the A~erican peonle were not 
ready with arms and aw_mQDition nor were they ready spirituelly . 
'l'he American people wished to do away with wars forever so 
the United .States tried to outlaw war and avoid any future 
conflicts with nations and if such conflicts did come the 
Amari can people would remain aloof . 'l'his attitude v. as 
expressed by the actions of the United States in the Leag,ue 
1 
of Nations . 
World War II g ve an entirely new experience . The 
United States had to share the ;urden of this w8r and felt 
that in order to make the nations safe a orld commnnity 
should be !'ormed . 2 l'nlike its actions in the LePt:;ue of Nations , 
1 John H . Latane '1nd DRvid '1ainhouse , A .t.istory of 
merican Foreign Policy ( f~Aw York : rrhe Odyssey fress , 194:0), 
pp . 620 - 641 . 
2 Depar~ent~ $tate , Publication Number 2353 . 
I 
the United States took an active part in forming the United 
.Nations . 
2 . The •'n.ergence of Atomic_.veapons : 
Due to the development of atomic weapons and super-
sonic airplanes the distances betwe8n nations grew minute , 
helping the American to real i ze that the policy of isolationiJb 
was no longer useful . It became cle~r that once started ther~ 
would be no time mar~in left in order to build armaments . 
'l'he above developments a l ong with the presence of 
~~erican forces in Europe and Asia and practically all other 
parts of the world changed the earlier concept . The United 
States now started a positive approach in rorld ,<1ff.qirs by 
econo:r1.ic Hid and nolitical assurance . Thus, a new chapter 
in American Foreian Policy starts here . 
The Evolution of American J:t'oreign Policy: 
'l'he North Atlantic Pact , which indicated the evolution 
jin our foreign )Olicy , is only a longer step in col"'!parison 
to other actions in the past ten years . The others are as 
follows : 
l . Lend Lease : 
T'his was the first important orocedure in the 
restoration of American Foreign Policy in order to save the 
nations from the domination of a sin~le voice , to restore 
s oV'm ideas 
6 . 
and institutions might flourish. 
~he Dnited Nations: 
The victorious powers had accomplished the maximum in 
cooperation in defeating the Axis pov'ers . This cooneretion 
made them realize that joint measures should be ~g8in 
emoloyed that would prevent further expansion and conauest . 
Eager to maintain the unity of the victorious powers 
II 
I 
:I 
I 
,and insLITe peace through~ collective 
I 
I 
system the United State~ 
•took part in forming an intern.Sltional org-anization on June 26, 
11945. ~his date m•rks tho oirth of ~. Ch~rter of the United 1 
Nations . 
I 3. The Truman Doctrine: 
I It became clear after the Second World Nar th-t the 
,Soviet olitburo constituted a threat to the peace by 
exerting its pressure on defenseless states. It started to 
I 
I 
put 9ressure on Greece and Turkey and diplomatic strains on 
Iran. 
The United States imrnerli tely aflve fiT1"nci_<1l support 
to G-"'eece 8.nd Turkey and diplomatic support to Ir'ln. 
Ho 111ever, these ~~Je-re only s ton-rrRD mea su-r"" c::. T'1e 'Jn-1 ted St.., t<> 
had to come out with definite and over-all plans based on 
3 Arneric"'n interF.:st3 in the post-"rar world. 
L. Schum2n, International Polit ics ( NPw 
7 . 
4. arshall ..t'l8.n: 
A more definite and detailed nrograrn became e""fective 
'ri th the Marshn.ll Plan . T:h~ United States realized th::>t a 
return to normal times for western democracy was a matter of' 
a long time . Nestern Europe was devRsted by war . Its 
economy w~s shattered. It ne.~ded a helning hand to be put 
upon its feet . It needed self- sufficiency and self- confid~nc~ 
in order that these nations vould be R~nin stable and 
contribute strongly to world security . 4 
5. The Rio Pact : 
In keeping with the Ch~rter of' the United Nations, the 
United States participated in the formation of' hemisnheric II 
security cact. This is auite clear now in ·roving the outloo 
of' the American peo~le and shows a significant link in the 
process and events leading to the North Atl8.ntic Pact . 
On August 15 , 1947 twenty American nations heard the 
.!:'resident of the United States and the alliance was si.crned . 
The r~sulting document was comprehensive . 5 
4Ibid ., p . 819 . 
5 Arv'endix G. 
8 . 
In substance, it was vithin the Charter of the United 
Nations , creatin~ P collective system for Inter-American 
defense . It condemned war but m::1de provisions to take armed 
action jointly in the event of ~n att0ck from an external 
source and elso to keep peace among the nations in the 
American hemisphere . 
The Rio Pa ct w s regarded ~ being onother Monroe 
Doctrine . This treaty was concluded •rith no thouaht th~t 
it might et an ex mple for other such re ional pacts in other• 
parts of the world . 
Nevertheless , the experience the United States chieved 
from the Rio P ct h d considerable bearing on the nro~osed 
security for the European sp.~ere . Here it is evident how 
the United StP.tes let go of its tr8ditional hemispheric 
isolationism. 6 
6Department of StPte , Public?tion 3462 , (II~"'rch 19, 
1949), pp . 6-7. 
9 . 
CHAPTI!;R III 
1'HE NORTH A'l,LA.NTIC PACT AND ITS EUROPEAN DEVELOPl\IENT 
In the previous chapter the discussion and political 
trend was stated from the American hemispheric background . 
'NoVJ it must be examinec1 from its Eurooean back12-round . 
When the Axis powers wel:'e defeated FrBnce and EnglAnd 
came out as exhausted nR.tions . The only two nations 
remaining in strong positions were the United States of 
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics . 
Russia , though damaged by WRr, still emerged intact 
with some of its industries and boundaries expanded Rnd a 
huge industrial pooulntion . Russia felt that her future 
glory could be achieved by power politics and by shrewdly 
capturing the time element in achieving the driver ' s position 
in JOW<O'r 'Y)Oli tics . In gaining the above points it must keep j1 
the population under its influence by strict state control 
by means of an "Iron Curtain11 • Therefore , in order to r:rain 
these ends Russia continually follovred the above ideas 
bringing about a 11 cold wartr . Consequently, the intercourse 
between nations ceased to function and in order to keep the 
relationship between the nations surviving it became necessar 
to form agreements and pacts of l ocal or repional nature . 
11 These pacts were formed between n::ttions that clid not believe 
in the methods Russia had determined to execute in her 
J 
.I 
dealin~s with the other nations of the ·orld . 1 
Aids : 
lthough the following unions betveen nations ~Vere 
ec~nomic instead of political they have been of considerable 
influence in the ~olitical phase and it is not pos ible to 
draw a very clear line of separation betv'eAn the realms of 
economics and politics . 
Even before the war vas over this rePional rouping 
had taken place on September 5 , 1944 . This ar:reement vas 
between Belgium, the Netherl-nds and Luxembourg . The 
1
governments of these nations were then in exile in England . 
The agrement , signed on the above d-te by these nations , WBS 
designed for ost- war economic aid and was to be carried out 
for a period of fifteen years . 2 
Such other re~ional a~reements were st8rted in 
I September , 1947 Rnd signed on December 22 , 1947 betveen ranee 
and Italy in order to share the raw materials , French capital 
I surplus and Italian manpower . 3 
I 
1Halford L . Hoskins , The Atlnntic Pact ( · shin~Tton , 
D. C. : Public Affairs Press , 1949), p . 20 . 
2 
ndrew and :;'ranees 'Joyd , /estern Union (London : 
Hutchinson & Co . ( Publishers ) Ltd ., 1948 ), pp . 54- 55 . 
3Ibid ., p . 55 . 
11. 
l1eamvhile , consideration had begun between other 
countries , namely ; Norway , Sweden , Denmark and Iceland . These 
countries sent their foreign ministers to discuss ~utual aid 
agreements in Copenha~en on August , 1947 . Although the 
conference did not arrive on definite execution the idea of 
mutual aid was there . 4 
With the introduction of the.Marshall Plan ( now called 
the European Recovery Pro ram ) a serious thouQht vas ~iven 
toward coordinating th8 economic ~rou~ings of the above 
countries . Therefore , in Seotember , 1947 , thirteen of the 
1
s ixteen Euro~ean Recovery Provram nations formed a joint 
group to study the matter . This economic exnerience betwAen 
nations has been of definite contribution in political affairs 
and was of great influence in further olitical moves . 5 
4 Boyd , ~· cit . , p . 55 . 
5noskl·ns , o •t 21 
_E_ . --22:_ ., p . J • 
12. 
CHAPTER IV 
A R SUHE OF THE PACTS 
Soviet Russia signed two treaties with western allies-) 
Urea t Britain and J:t 'rqnce . 'rhese treH ties were the An@:lo -
Soviet Treaty of May 26 , 1942 and the Franco - Soviet Treaty of 
I 
.De c ember 20 , 1944 . ~hese alliances had virtue during the Mar 
but afterw8rds they were ground for Russia to criticize J.''rance 
and Encland in joining the Porth A tl . .,nt i c Pact. 
The Anglo-Soviet Alli8nce : 
~his rreaty of Alliance, entered into in 1942, is stil\ 
~ally in fo~0~ thavah game of its orovisions have no 
~tility (Articles 1 , 2 and 3 (1) ) . 
The principle oblig2tion is of assistance in c~se 
Germany or its satellites start aggression again ( trticle 4) . 1 
I 
Article 7 of the treaty stc tes that neither the United I 
Kingdom nor the U. S.S . R . will enter into any alliance directe~ 
Atlantic fact is not directed again t any nation in prrticular . 
1 Sir W. ~ric 3e ckett, The North Atlanti c Treaty , The 
.5russels 'I'reat and The Ch~rter of the Urii ted Nations 
London: Stevens & Sons Limited, 1950 , p . 32 . 
2 It apDlles only against an aggressor , whoever it may be . 
The articles of the Alliance could be put into two 
main headings: (1) Articles of mutual assistance in c"se of 
aggression from Germany and its satellites ( Articles 3 (2) 
and (4) . (2) frovisions for not entering into any coalition 
directed against the other ~arty (Articles 5 , 6 and 7 ) ; to 
respect the political independence of other countries and not 
to interfere with each others internal affairs; to cooperate 
lin the organization of the sec .1rity of Europe both politicall~ 
and economically . 
I 
However , Russia did not care for the political' 
independence of Eastern Europe and hardly W8S coo~erative in 
Euro~e . Therefore , Russia herself has broken the provisions 
of the alliance and under the circumstances it was fair for 
England to join the North Atlantic Pact . 3 
The Dunkirk Treaty : 
On March 4 , 1947 England and France signed a fifty 
year treaty of alliance . This alliance , under Article 2, 
2 John r'oster Dulles , The Atl<lTitic Pact , Statement before 
the .fi'oreign rlelations Committee of the United States Senate, 
(New York : Carnegie Endowment for International Peace , 1949 ) 
pp . 4 - 5 . 
3oeckett , Q£ . cit ., p . 33 . Also see Appendix E . 
14 . 
l 
I is against the German a ggression . This article obli~ates the 
parties to help each other if GermPny becomes an aggressor 
once more . 
Article 1 of this treaty empowers each of the nqtions 
to find wn~'"s and means of supressing another German a ggression . 
This alliance clearly states thPt it is in accordance 
I 
with the Cherter of the United Nations , Articles 49, 51 , 52, 
53 and 107 . 4 
By the early months of 1948 the differences between 
Soviet Hussia and other free nations of the v·orld grew beyond 
1 expectations . The two rivals , the United States vlith the 
Marshall ~lan and Russia with her Cominform, started battling 
land Russia immediately started a number of close alliances 
1between herself and the vassal states . 5 
On January 22 , 1948 , when the atmosphere between Russi~ 
1
and /estern Europe 'N8S becoming dimmer everydqy , Jritish 
jPoreign Minister , Ernest Bevin , in a speech in the House of 
1 Commons concluded that "the free nations of v.estern .:Surope 
must now draw closely together . " 11 VJe are thinking now of 
4Beckett , ££· cit ., pp . 18- 19 . Also see Appendix E . 
5Halford L . Hoskins , The Atlantic Pact ( .~ashington , 
D. C. : Public Affairs fress , 1949 ), p . 22 . 
15. 
j: 16 . 
Western Europe as a unit . u6 
rl'he reaction to Bevin ' s speech vras immediate and 
effective . By ]/larch 17, 1948 England , France and the Bene lux 
states had si 7 ned the treaty called the Brussels 'l'reaty . 
The Brussels Treaty: 
Like the North Atlantic Pact , the Brussels Treaty 
puts a premium on human rights and fundamental freedoms . Its 
Articles 4 and 5 oblige the ~articipRting members to aid each 1 
! 
other in the event of attack on any member . 
The dis ,utes qmong the p8rties , according to 4rticle 8 
1 will be settled either by the Hague Court if a legal matter, 
otherwise by conciliation . 
It provides for cooperation in social and economic 
matters. Other p~rties believing in the rinciples of the 
treaty sre invited to join . 
'I'he treaty provides a consultative council to de"'~l 
with any questions regarding the treaty and its articles . 
1l'his council discusses the economic or military danger and 
how to overcome these difficulties . It has nrovisions for 
overall military matters as well as economic affairs . Some 
people consider this treaty of immen8e v~lue tovard the 
6 . Andrew and Frances Boyd , vestern Un1on (London: 
Hutchinson & Co . (Yublishers ) Ltd ., 1948), pp . 60-61 . 
unification of Europe . 7 
l'he re c:;ons, irmlicPtlon and P"en0ral effect of th.e e 
~bove oacts ~e~e , s follows: 
~he .n lo- S0viet Alliance of 
wi.t t·.he ide.., of .. 11utu l f S' · c:;t· n"" ·co di"'lcussed in the previo~s 
c~Rpter . This alliance had one virtue durin~ the cloning 
days of the W"'r but as time ''ent on it "hec8.me 1J.<JP1 "'S except 
fnr the fact that Ru sia found grounds , b~ ed on this alliCJYlC , 
!or attqckinc the l e Plity o~ the North Atlantic P~ t (A~tlclel 
7 of the An lo-Soviet Alliance ~ c'ted in Ch8pter III) •8 
Even before the close o the l "te war R cle"v~ . 
i c rnible . Commencing ·~th the Soviet - Czecho~lovak TrAqty 
De em~er 1 2. , 1943, the Soviet Union emb?rked on n serie o 
alliances with the other states of Central and ~astern ~urope . 
These Alliances have evolved into the bloc whose boundaries 
are m?rked by the "Iron Curtain". 9 
The more recent dr~wing together of the /estern 
~uropean states in political alli nces has been, to uite an 
extent, a response t o the formati on of the Soviet bloc with 
7 Beckett , ££· cit ., pp . 271- 24 . Also see ppendix C. 
8~oskins , ££ • cit., p . 15. 
'See Appendix H. 
17 . 
18 . 
~================ --- r 
its oolicy of subv8rsive activities in non- Communist 
t . 10 coun,r1es . 
'l'he Dunkirk Tr"", ty Wf'l s n1ore or less an introduction to 
the .orussels P8,..t . When the Western PO\'ers "'~' r the Eastern 
b l oc of Sovi8t rlussia it bPcame evident to the Vestern po ers 
th' t they must form such alliances to balance the poviTers in 
~urope . 11 
rl'he Brussels Pact , or .'estArn Union, w, s an invitation 
to the United St8tes to join in collective security . t<'urther ,
1 
the \~'estern po'vers rqalized that v·i thout the mBteri ~1 , nd 
moral help of the United States the '/estern Union could not 
be strong and the onl country which could offer aid was the 
United States . 
~he United States , at this time , felt th3t the United 
N tions 'as not functioning os had been expected . 'l'horpf'ore, 
explor2 tory conversq tions, looldng tow'3.rd f' North A.tl' nti c 
security 'Jact , were bep-un in Washington 1n J uly , 1948 ·t the 
instance of members of the Brusse l s Pact . 12 
10 k' . Hos 1ns , Q£· clt ., p . 15 . 
l l 'l'he New York Times, Uarch 29 , 1049 . 
12Beckett , ~· cit ., p . 23 . 
I 
I 
CHAPTER V 
REr.t RATORY STEPS TOWARD THE NORTH A'liLANT IC PACT 
The paramount desire of the American people has been 
peace ·lnd freedom . Since 1776 they have constantly striven 
rand sometimes fought to maintain their own freedom and to 
!further the development of freedom elsewhere . 
Since 1823, when the Monroe Doctrine was nromulgated , 
the United States has made it cleer that it would consider an 
armed attack upon any part of the Americas es an attack upon 
the United States . No other doctrine has become more d0eply 
imbedded in American foreign policy .l 
I 
In 1947 all of the American Republ ics joined in 8i~n-
ing the Treaty of Hio de Janeiro, which nrovided that each 
lnation would regard an attack on any one of them as an ttack 
upon all . 
Since vvorld vvar II the United States has wholeheartedl, : 
accepted the obli~ation of the Charter of the United Nati ons 
and in doing so has undertaken the obligation of not using 
force except in conformity with the United N~ti ons. The United 
States has used its influence to see thqt other powers live 
1 John H. Lrtane and David 'Vainhouse, A History of 
American Foreign Policy ( New York : The Odyssey frPss , 1940), 
p . 846 . 
l 
The concern of the American people, after w tching the 
unfavourable external pressure of Soviet Russia , led to the 
introduction into the Senate of a resolution called the 
"Vandenberg Reso lution" on May 19, 1948. This resolution ¥as 
I 
8dopted on June ll, 1948 and WR s in R.ccord8nce with the 
!provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. 5 
I On March 5, 1946, ~Vinston Churchill, speakine in 
II 
'ul ton, r issouri said that thP LJni ted StAtes and Great .~ri tain 
should join in "fraternal association" backed by armed 
alliance for mutual defense. 6 Chur~hill 1 s {'lP" nt thqt time 
inspired no action . ~uite contrary , people beli3ved that the 
st,..,tement was out of time and out faith in the United Nations 
which rould promote internationql ~eace and security. 
As time went by in the post- war period the people 
I 
began to questi on their belief in Russian cooper1:-1tion in worldj 
affairs · nd in the United ~ations . This started a move of 
American opinion especially after the Commnnist seizure of 
control in Czechoslovakia, a state that had friendly relRtions 
with the United States . From that point, in FebruAry, 1948, 
5 ;See ppendix D 
6 nTrend Towerd Rival rllocs Bndangers the United Nati 
Or!2"anization, 11 F'oreign l'olicy Bulletin, Mar ch 15, 1946. 
21 . 
I 
steps toward the North Atlantic act st~rted sh~ping rquidly . ~ 
The European Recovery frogram : 
'rhe European Recovery lan , by ·rhich thP United St tes 
took the responsibility of helping war- ravaped EuroDe , made 
an influence on the American neople in their thinking tow rd 
Europe . 'fhe sixteen countries under the Euro )ean Recovery 
Plan became of interest to An1P.ricans Rnd they begQn to 
believe th~t the vell - being of iestern Europe remained in 
:economic help ~nd in uolitical st· bility . Economic help could 
1not make Europe safe however , and a political understanding 
1 became day by day an urgent move .
8 
I 
Yresident 'l'ruman 1 s Views: 
On !1arch 17, 1948 , the day rhen the Brussels Tre::tty 
was signed , the resident of the United States said th-t the 
United States !V'ould help the "estern Union ( .Jrussels Treaty 
members) in every way . 
This (the '/estern Union ~"'act) deserves our full sunoort . 
I am confident thot the United States will , by approuriate 
means, extend to the nn.tions the uu.,o-rt vhich thP situation 
requires . I am sure th t thf nP.terroin~tion of the free 
7Halford L . Hoskins , 'l'he '\ -~-lanti c Pact ( •!"l.shington, D . 
C.: _ublic ffairs Press , 1949 ), p . 25 . 
8Boyd , op . cit ., pp . 48- 50 . 
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countries to protect themselves will be matched by an enual 
etermination on our part to helu them do so . 9 
On June 11, 1948 Senator Arthur Vandenberg modified 
above statement of the Pr8sident of the United States by 
ntroducing Sencte Resolution 239 .10 This resolution was 
dopted by a majority of 4 to 4 and thus l aid a new corner-
stone in Arnerican Foreign Policy . 
This hPsolution hRd six ~rovJqions . ThreP of these 
mqining; provis·i ons dPnl t Pith re,r,i on 1 and col1Pctlve 
'SPCOri t.v in the un· tc :'bJi...es and proposed thqt the Un"i t.n 
t"t-:-3 should join COnstitutionally v·itb othAr nri+-ions in 
!f-aintP ininr its national security . ~'he Resoluti.o!" "'[' s ·rithin 
the Charter of the United N tions OrFanization and its 
I· rti clo , Hum.bers 51 and 52 . 
rhe l)eg; inning of the North fl."t-1 antic Pact: 
The Department of State WAS encourag13d by the ahove 
~e olution of the SenPte of the Un:Lted States and immediately 
10 ened discu sions both with nnn.,da .<lnd the Wec::tPrn Union 
9Dep '1rtment of St."' te t-sulletin , Iv'fq,..ch 28, 1948 . 
lOsenate Resolution 239 , 80th Congress, Second Session, 
une 11 , 1948 . Also see Apnendix D. 
I 
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States with the ide. of collective security . At the sqme 
time, the Militarv representatives of the United States ~nd 
I 
Cana~a beo-an to negotiate tAlks 'ri th the Perr1anent 1/fili tary [ 
Comm1ttee of the Western Union on the matters o:f co'11pr""hensive 
I security. 'l'he Cann.dian Secretgry of State for H'xternal 
Affairs, Lester B. Pearson, became strongly in favour of such 
an alliance . 11 
by October, 1948 Agreements had been regched between 
~Canada , the United States and the fifestern Union nations that 
were within the Cherter of the United Nations Or ·anization . 
On J·=tnuRry 20, 1949 President r.rruman said: 
The primary purpose of these a.11;reements is to --rovide 
unmistakable ~roof of the joint determination of the free 
countries to resist armed ~ttack from any cuarter . Each 
countrv pa,...ticipating in these arrgnP"Aments must ~"'ontribute 
all it can to the common defense . I hope soon to send to 
the ~enate a treaty respecting North Atlantic Security Flan. 
In addition , we will nrovide milit"'ry advice and equipment 
to free nations "'hich v•i ll cooperate with us in the 
maintenance of peace ~nd security . l2 
11F'oreiP-;n ?olicy Reports , Volume 24, No . 19, February 
15, 1949, p . 228 . 
1 1 2Eiryhty- first Con"":ress, lst Session. Inaugural 
address of rlarry S. TrumPn delivered ~t the Capitol, 
January 20, 1949 . 
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On J::muary 10, 1949 the President of the United St"l. tes, 
lin his Budget ~essa~e , said : 
'I'he instrument of our policy rer_uiring the largest 
easure of budgetary support are the extraordinary progrBms of 
economic and military aid to those nations and peoples who 
share our international objectives and our determinPtion to 
fake them effective . l3 
!Statement of the Department of State : 
When the conversations were well under woy on the 
~orth Atlantic Alli"l.nce, the Dep8rtment of State issued a 
circular in order to inform the Americqn neople . This stated 
that the Vandenberg Resolution--
Is a logical extension of the decision-- implicit in our 
ember3hip in the United NR.tions -- to t'='ke Bn active part in 
Jorld affairs to insure world "'Jell ce and our own security .•.• 
consider tion of the international situation developed 
during the past three years clearly reveals the major faJtors 
1that make necessary the kind of policy set forth in the 
!Vandenberg Resolution--dissensions in the United Netions , the 
rcrowth of fear and insecurity, and obstruction of the 
cooperative efforts to eliminate the causes of that feRr . • .• 
~uring three years of unavailing attempts to secure an 
adjustment in Soviet policies , it became increasingly evident 
l:that peace - loving nations would have to take direct action, ,consistent vrith the Rims and spirit of the Charter , to prevent 
the further loss of freedom and to reduce the danger of 
aggression .•.• 
'Iii th reference to the economi c a i d pro~Sram , the 
statement said in summary : 
It was clear that if a catastrophe , nossibly r<=Jsulting in 
the collapse of western civilization, was to be avoided , the 
afflicted countries must combine their energies and resources 
1in a concentrated effort toward economic recovery . It was 
eoually clear that no cooperative effort , however determined , 
could succeed without help from the United States . 
Department of State Bulletin, January 23 , 1 9 
I 
il 
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If vorld recovery is to progress , the sense of security 
must be resto-red . Since the thrAflt of a....,med qggression is 
at the root of insecu~r.'i ty, collective '"'ction 7hich rill 
enable free nations to confront a potential fl0'0'ressor with 
preponderant power , to ether with economic recovP.ry and 
political stability , orovides the only s~tisfactory antidote 
to fear ...•.. Association of the United States snd Canada ,,ith 
nations of 'vestern Union in a North Atlanti c regional securit-yi 
pact •••• will have far - reaching imnlications for the future 
peace rnd security of the worl d .l4 
To this the Secretary of State subsequently added : 
'l'he American people unouestionabl y wish the great no ver 
and influence of the United States to be exerted for oeace . 
This Government is determined to exert its influence to weave •• 
a vorld fabric of internationa l peace and security ..... I 
Our national security is vit~llv affected by the security 
of the North tlnntic area . The peoples of the Forth Atl'"'ntic 
, rea have a common heri t~r;e and civilization . Je l·orth 
•Atlantic peonles share a co~~on faith in fundqmental human 
rights , in the di~nity and orth of the human person , in the 
principles of democracv , ryersonnl freedom , nd nolitic~l 
liberty . We believe in the rule of la!IJ among nations as 
among men and that the United Nations must ~e stren~thened in 
its task of maintaining international peace nnd security . 
.Je believe that these principles and this common hP.ri t ge 1 
can best be fortified and preserved qnd the senpral welfare 
of the peo1le of the North ~tlontic qrea dvanced by an 
!arrangement for cooper. tion in m~tter! affecting their peRce 
1
and security and common interet • . •.• 5 
26 . 
14Department of St'1.te , Publicat1on 3377 : Foreign 
Affairs Outlines No . 19 , Building the Pe'"'ce Series , January , ~949 . 
15DepRrtment of State Bulletin, Secretary of State 
Acheson ' s Statement: Purnose-ofPro osed North t~tlantic Trea 
CFfAPTER VI 
IN1'.:.!.RPHft_/rA'l'ION OJ:!' 'rHE AR'T'ICLES OF 'l'HE NORTH ATLANTIC PACT1 
It is necessary to examine the provisions of the North 
'tltlantic ~act in order 
I 
hing is certain, that 
change in the American 
to understand its implications . One II 
the North Atlantic Pact gave a radical 
Foreign Policy from that of isolationisf 
to internationalism. 
~he Necessity for International Alliances for the United State~: 
Varying as they do in extent of territory , size and 
vigor of nopulations , natural resources , strategic positions 
and ideals, nations necessarily vqry in the extent to which th@y 
lare able to im:Jlement their policies mith force . Not many 
nations T.Jossess the elements of force to an extent which 11:ill 
insure the success of their uolicies and the inviability of 
their territories and other material interests . 2 
In fact , at no neriod in modern times has any single 
state possessed the strength or ~eographical position to 
warrant a line of conduct in international spheres which 
1would fail to take cognizance of the attitude of potential 
lrteport of the Committee on Foreign Relations : North 
Atlantic Treaty (United States Government Printing Office : 
·,vashington , 1949) , Blst Congress , lst Session, ~xecutive 
Report No . 8 . Also See Appendi x E . 
the Atl2ntic t'E'ct," 
u 
I 
I 
Article 2: Developm nt o_f_ Pe':_9eful and Friendly Relations . 
This article is an affirmation of faith . The parties 
believe in peace . 'l'he parties undertake to strengthen their 
institutions, promote 9ocial order and economic cooperation. 
Article 3: Self- help and hut1J.R.l Aid . 
rticle 3 emDodiAs in the T~n~ y the ryrincip le of 
continuous and effe~tive elf-help nnd m·,tu'"~l aid formed on 
the oosis of th8 B1 o~e I ~rtr P 7 Fro ·r'"~ . It ~ons that 
each party must do its utmost to help itsel and its sh"re 
to help the others . 
A realiRtic ~ssess~ent of the de en ir~ DD~city 
necessary to resist or~ed ~tt· ck will be the function of hA 
or ;anization to be est'"~blished under ~rticle 9. On the basis 
of this as"essment each P'"rty would dete~mine for itself :<Jhat I 
it could most effectively contribute in the fori'1 of focilitiA , 
military equipment, productive cap 2citv , mnnno•Jer, t>tc. 'J,he 
decision 1ould be taken in the lifht of the resources Pnd 
geographical location of the individu l state with due reP'ardl 
to economic st bilitv . There is no specific obligntion as to 
the timing, nA.ture nd extent of a sist nee to he iven by 
any p rty . 
uestions have been raised as to '"Thether the United 
Stqtes , under Article 3, vould be obli~P.d to assist the other 
parties to develop the c~pacity of their overseas territories ~ 
to resist qrmed attack . The United St"l.tes is under no 
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obli ation to assist the other p, rties in buil inp up 
I 
lmilitflry ·~stA-blisbments for use in their overse~s terri t.ories 
nor to en,a" ge in resisting arrr1ed attack outside the qrAa 
defined in Article 6 . The present object is to maintrin 
I lne~ce and security in the ~orth Atlqntic area . 
I 
!Article 4: Consultation . 
I 
IJ.'he parties agree to consult toaether whenever any 
party reauests this . This is in case a member ' s territorial 
I 
integrity or political independence or the security of any 
party is thre~tened . Secret"ry of State Dean Acheson 
believes thct developments anywhere in the 1.orld which might 
affect thA ecurity of a member o the l=tlliance vTould renuire 
c nsultation . 4 
Article 4 meRns that the meMbers of the P ct consider 
•any q med Rtt~ck on the territory of any of the 2rties in 
Europe , North America, AlR"eria in North Africa , on H-:nropean 
.occupation forces , island nossessions, vessels or airc,.,aft of' 
I 
alliance members ~ ithin the treaty area as an attack on them 
I 
all, and, consequently the members vill t8l{e measures 
individually and collectively, including the use of ermed 
I 4secret~ry of Stste Acheson at a Press Conference , 
!The New York Times , March 19 , 1949 . 
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lforce , as each party deems necessary to restore and maintain 
the security of the North Atlq_ntic area . 
1 Article 5 : Action in the Event of Armed Attack . 
Article 5 is the core of the Treaty . The parties 
9StPblish the principle that an Brmed attack arainst one or 
more is considered an attack on all of them . This nrticle 
is powerful and '~'arns any agP-;ressor that Rny att<1clr on any 
jof the members will be met by combined resistance from all of 
l the signatories . Each party would have the responsibility to 
determine when and if an armed Pttack occurred . Each party is 
'left to decide "such action as it deems neces ary . " This 
means that each party is free to use its jud-ement in order 
to help the security of the North Atlantic area . This means 
that each country will take its independent actions in 
accord~nce to its constitution • 
. Article 6 : Description of the North Atlgnti c Area . 
The area includes not only the North Atlantic OceRn 
1 in a narrow sense but the western part of the Mediterrnnean 
as well as the North Sea and most of the Gulf of Mexico . The 
area is defined in general terms rather than defined by l i nes 
on a map . If an attack occurred on a ship a few miles out of 
the limits of the North Atlanti c area then each party would 
necide for itself according to the particular circumstances . 
The overseas possessions , rather the territories 
under the 
l 
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Pact with the exception of Algeria , Alaska , the Aleutian 
Islands and the islPnds of the Canadian Arctic . 
Article '7 : P,ramount Authority of the United Nations . 
The primary responsibility of maintqining peace and 
security is in the hands of the Security Council of the Uniteq 
Nations and the parties to the Pact shall have their 
obligations to the Chart e r of the United Nations . 
Article 8: Possible Con~lict ··i th Other Treaties . 
This states that none of the existing international 
engagements of the members is in conflict with the Treaty . 
The Treaty is not desi ~ned against any party or against any 
a ggressor . For example, Russia has an alliance with France il 
and ~ngland against another German aggression and their treat 
states tha t the parties shnl l not take part in any such 
alliance or coalition directed solely against any nation . 
However, the North Atlc.ntic Pact is not directed against any 
Darticular nation or nations but against only any aggressor. 
Regarding the Italian p eace treaty , the Department of State 
made it clea r that the contribution of Italy in collective II 
,defense shall be in qccordance to the fixed milit?ry provisions 
of the Italian peace treaty . 
Article 9: Organization of the Treaty . 
No detailed organization has been set in the Treqty . 
The Council of the Treaty has only advisory powers v·i th 
32 . l 
respect to governmental action . Bach government is free to 
take its own action and the Council of the North Atl~ntic 
~act can only put reco~~endations for collo.ctive defense . 
No party wi l l have a veto nor eRn it be coerced into taking a 
decision against its ovm jud'"'"ement . The defense or any other 11 
such planning a~ency shall be subordinate to the Council with 
only advisory powers like those of the Council . 
Article 10 : New ~\fJembers . 
Unanimous agreement is reouired to invite other 
states to join the North Atlantic Pact . Other European states 
l
in the North A+lantic area could be invited to join the 
', Pact . No provisions were made to the signatories of the Rio 
!TrAaty to join the North Atlantic Pact . 
The new meT)')ber has to be auproved by the SenAte of the 
United States . Regardin~ the joining of Spain, the question 
will depend upon the unanimous opinion of the signatories . 
Western Germany may someday be included in the 
alliance, however it is protected since the Treaty covers 
armed attack unon occupation forces . 
Article 11: Constitutionel Pro ces ses . 
This article takes into consideration that any action 
taken by a member regarding the Treaty must be 11 in accordance 
with their respective constitutional nrocesses . " This phrase 
means that the will of the people must "IJe rer'n ... ded in 
jl 
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democratic ways and action tRken through ponul'='r support . 
This article, in the United St tes, does not incre8se 
or de crease the powers of Cono-ress !'md the President . The 
I 
!President has the :Cul l authority as the Commander-in- Chief 
of the al"'n.ed forces but CongrPS3 only can declar'e v3.r. Some 
pP.o_ le qu0stion that if the President croqtes such a nasi tion 
,congress is forced to declare rnr . The answer is only time l 
It ~urther tates thAt the Trea .r 
will be effe~tive after the original sign~tories - Belgium, 
Canada, l:''rc>nce, Luxembourg, the Netherl· nds, the United 
I Kingdom and the United States - ratify the 'l1 reaty and deposit 
it with the United States Government. 
. I
1 rticle 12: Revie•v nd Amendmt=mt of the Tre:1. ty. 
The sign'ltories can review and add amendments to the 
P~ct after it h~s been in ~orce or ten yeRrs . Such changes 
would cope with changing world conditions Hnd any chan_p-es in 
its urovisions qould require unanimous approval by the 
signatory countries. In the case of the United States, the 
Sen~te would have to sive its consent. 
Article 13: Duration o~ the Treaty . 
This states that after the Treaty has been in force 
for twenty years any party can cease to be a member after one 
years ' notice of denunciation to the United States Government 
which in turn will inform other signatories of such notice • 
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There i s no provision f o r expulsion or the suspension 
of a member . However , i f a member fa:t l s t o l ive up to the 
Preamble or the provisions of the Pa c t and persistently 
violRtes the principles of the Pact it will receive no 
obligations from other members . A member that has succumbed 
!to Com.nmnism wi l l have l ost ( "founded on the principles of 
ldemocrP-cy , individual liberty Hnd the rule of l aw" ) i ts 
11 free institutions . " A countPy suffering such a destiny 
I 
would not be in a position either to carry its o·m oblhrt=~tions 
or expect any assistance from other signatories . 
Article 1 4 : Authenticity of Texts . 
This is to make sure that the French and English 
languages used in the Pact are identical in meaning . Any 
·difference in meanings is to be settled in by interpretation 
and negotiati on . 
Thus , this simnle but vital instrument was signed . 
!I 
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C.tiAP'l'ER VII 
'rHE AWl'ICL2;S ON THE 'tl<;fHONAL ARBA JGBr~rTS 
O.t<' ·r3E UNI'rED NM'IONS AND 'I'HE NO.R'rH A'i'LL\.I'riC PACTl 
In the previous chapter the Preamble ~nd the articles 
of the Jorth Atlanti c Pact ;vere discussed . Both the reamble 
and the articles put the faith of the signatories in the 
of international peace and security and u:ron .\rticle 51 "hi ch 
recognizes the right of the i ndividual or collective self-
1 de ~· ense when a member of the United Nations and non- member 
(Articles 34 and 35 ) is attacked unti l the Security Counci l 
lhas t aken measures to maintain international peace and SPcuriuy . 
1Marina Salvin, The North Atlantic Pact (lew York : 
Carnegie Endowment for I nternational Peace , May , 1949 ), 
No . 451 , pp . 41 4- 415 . 
2see App endi x B. 
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Article 56 simply states that any contemplation of 
regional arrangements should be informed to the Secu~ity 
Council . The North Atlantic ~act signatories did inform the 
1United Nations of their intentions and f inal action . 
I 
II 
I 
CHAPTER VIII 
DE;BA'l'E OF THE NORTH ATLAWI'I C PACT IN THE UNITED A'l'IONSl 
Nhen the North Atlantic Pact was ta1-ren up as an issue 
in the United Nations there i"Tere two distinct camps divided 
in power _Joli tics. One camp sided with the North Atl8.ntic 
.t"act countries and the other 1.vi th '1ussia . Those nations who 
upheld Russia may be called the 11 E~=~stern 11 countries and those 
uphold the Pact may be called the 111 vestern" nations . 
The policy of the West rests upon the theory advanced 
by rflr . Churchill at Fulton, Illissouri in 1\,arch, 1946 , that the 
Soviet Union alone is responsible for the world crisis and 
that the Soviet thre~t to peace is essentially a threat of 
physical conquest . Prom this theory is derived the policy of I 
seeking to contain the Soviet threat within a physical frontier 
manned by physical force . 2 
The aims of the East were that the North Atlantic .Pact 
violates the ChPrter of the United Nations . Above all , the 
~United Notions Bulletin, Volume VI, No . 9, Hay 1 , l 0 4lj ' 
James .J . ·~rburg , 'J.hc orth tlPntic Secu_'i ty 
.rrogram, 11 ~tatement to the United utates uenc:.:.te Committee on ' 
1'oreign rle lations , .. Jay 6 , 1949 . 11 
~aste...,n c9.mp vm.s e.fraid of t: ..w est blishment of Tnilit~ry 
bases on tho borders of th'"l Soviet Union and the consequences 
3 
or' it . 
:1his Cl.B.Jter ;;ill bring :'orw2.rd wb:.1t ec>.ch r.~emoer of 
the ue cu. r>i ty Council h&d to s.ay on the m<-.t ter . io\:ever , 
I 
unr'ortunatel,y , there \•Jere no neutral members ':Vho had 
criti c ized both cam;Js . 'l'he discussion is ei thor for or 
against the :=~ct . 
ndrei . uromyko ( J . S •• t . ) said that the f;::-ct \'JUS 
built to undermine the united ~ations and to create a mi li tP.r .. 
and politicrtl bloc for a ne ·· war that the United States and 
I the United Kingdom [l_-~8 contc::nplating . 
·rom tlile time in )~rch , l 948 v1hen the ·'est ,rn Pion 
was formed , the blocs started 2orming with a de inite 
princi~le to exclude Russia from military and political blocs 
.-tussia maint~~ined that her treaties with the ?eoples 1 
.Jemocracies and behveen ... ranee and the Unl ted Kingdom were 
bilateral vith the aim to prevent rene~al of German a 0 gression 
and not directed against any other• great power . '.L'he North 
tlanti c l:"act is mul ti - later'al v1hich aims not only at 
p:!.•eventing German agsression but is directed FLgainst the 
3 enry ,· llace , 11 'l'he . r,rth , tlA.ntic TreAty , 11 Rearinc;s 
before the Cornni ttoe on ';:eeign tGla tions , United ,::>ta tes 
.::>enato , 8lst Cont~rcss , 1 Prt l, (United States GovRrment 
..trintins _'fice , ras'hington , 1:~ l.J ), pp . 418 -41~ . 
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poHer which bore the m.s.in brunt of w2r agains~ itlerite 
I ~-er:r.!any . 
''l:e sif,natOl.,ies of the J.:ortl., Atl'"nt ic .~.""ct 8.T'"'" t'- ing 
e2:tcnsi ve mili twl.'y measures ·vhi ch cannot be sE> id to be 
defensive in nature . 'l'~i s 1):-,rti culerly a:.J:9lies to th-; l.Jni ted 
.:>tate s , -r:;~e Unl ted -~j_ngdom Pnd !:'ranee ".'ll1.ere they re planning 
lae,ainst 1,uss ia \'i th an idea to '.lse atomic -ep ons . The Unite 
o.)t tes and the United Kinglom are building up at wide militarY] 
bases , especially on terlitories near ,ussia . The Jnited 
rdn0dom and the United States still m· int.,in in .. ashington 
a combined unit of chief's of stP.ff . 'l'hcre is a si"'lilar 
organi za tlon in E•'ontn.ine bleau set up by the members of the 
.Jestern Jnion . • ow ,-ould the -:..Tnited States react if some 
groat power maintained basss in I~exico? '1'l1e United Strt8s 
obviot sly ·.1ould not regard this measure ''S self - defense . 
It hB s been reported that the lJni ted States alr",' dy 
!has one hundred lnr'-'e :c-.1ili ·V1ry bases in foreign countries 
loes id.es in u82:'Ill8.n.)' ' 1 ust1•ia , J:::.pan , i::>OUtbern I orea and r.L'riest~ , 
including two hundred _fifty - six in the I= cii'i c basin, t'-~o 
hunC...L'ed tv:enty- eic;ht in the 1tlantic basin . 'l'h.ese bases 
were built by the United States in · orld , ar II and she is I 
also building l&rze bases in Iceland , Jrcece , Canada and other 
countries . 
~he 'orth atl&ntic PPct ai~s to interfere wlth the 
internal matters of other countries '1nd movements to stifle 
41 . 
national liber~t1on in colonies and dependent countries . 
'I'he c __ sracter of the text in the act shows that it 
is not a ree.ional pRct permissible under the Uni t;ed ati.ons 
Charter . '1It comprises st:Jtes located in t~•o dii:'ferent 
. t II III . . cont1nen ·s . ts sle:;nc..torles ~1ave not c::et themselves the 
1 tasx of settlin~ any ro ional reque:; ts . 1. r;rr bers of oven a 
t · .ly regional arrange~1'r.;nt made in accord2nco with the Cha:!:>ter. 
h.ve no riBht to t8ke military action ·ithout aut~orization 
from the ec~ity Council . Article 31 of the Ch.rte~ gives 
the r·i ht to t< .. ke action j_n elf - defens ~ only in the event of 
an F.:..•med f. ttack rc,ainst a menfoer of the LJni ted at:!.ons . ~~ot 
one o~ the signatories to the North ·tlantic ~act hns been 
suojected to an ar·mecl attacl: and no such attn.ck thre tens , 
eu_ ecially .~.·rom the .Soviet Union . 11 4 mssi1 fu.,:othor added that 
I t~1e act h s struck a blovr at the United lh)tions and has 1 
undermined th basis for its exi9tonce . 
do not thiru.: alil::e . ,.._-.i tish ]_ r ndlords , :"'anufr_ctU:'"'GI'S do not 
tnink like their 1 r bo:..'el"'S . P80 le in palaces think di fr.;rentlry 
than those in hovels . The si~na torie ~-re uni tlng not be cr,use 
their people think alike but the ruling ci:>clros of th United 
4 
ni ted 1 a tions -·Ulletin, iolurne VI , o . 9 , • ay 1 , 194:9 . 
p . 410 . 
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States and other signatories have similar ains of aGgression 
against uuss ia . 
llle Jnited St·:1tes an\1_ the United l in[:;dom want to 
dominEte the \~rld by force and have adopted to isolate the 
J . -=> . S . rL as they did in t e past that brought l itler into 
poner . 'L1ese circles ,h8ve entirely ~roken ··i th the _policy 
of 1eheran, .1. J. l ta and l'otsdam which aimed at intornl'-ltional 
coo~Joration . 11 Tho strug le arm.md tho question of the veto 
is a st'··u ,gle betwe>->n two tendencies in intern,-, -LionaJ. 1Jol i ti csil : 
the tendency to eictate , to isolatP the u. s . s . R ., to unleash 
the tFndency to uphold the II 
~tions , to frustr?.t the Jlnn ~ I basic urinciplos of th, United 
of aGgressors , to uru1ask ~ar mongers on the other . ' 5 
ur . Ado lf loffmeister (Gzechoslovakia): 
r . .offmeistei' maintained that the pact v:as not 
.ithin the united !lations Charter . rl'he lJO'Iil0rful press of the 
LJni ted Str tcs has been r.lobilizecl to t-~roclai:r:J. that the .!:-'act is 
defensive . The act is the measure designed against Russia . 
IJ.'he -'eople of Eastern -'urope rer_:ard the ·act as a threat to 
the cause of peace and beinc contradictory to the spirit and 
letter of t:!J.e Ch<.J.rtcr . Czochoslovalda asseJ:'ted that ninety 
5 rb-· a 
.L •' p • 111 
~he doclsive 
t-ctor ill come v:hon the race ..:.·or qr a snts c r.tes in the 
ter. •i torie"' of "J1 h r countries ·:1ot jn t b- si nin the ract 
y various overl~~ents . 
e resentl tlvos o_· the rulin ~ class hav'" 1) C) .e victims of 
:their oun lnsu.,erable h. sL r•ia t>nd psycho-.::is , , ~o·1 , hich has 
~Lsulted a fear engenderin0 nr.>w fear . ~ear is rAserv~d for 
the h8arts and souls of those vrho pr>epar··e the '.ir-lr . 
ladi~ir o.ovic ( gos l qvia ): 
One of the m·in ~oints thqt is ca~ried by the Pcct is 
he re - est. blisrunent of -..er·r-1~ n in .ustPy in the Rnhr p-r· '- , thus 
I 
to increLsc Lrerm'~n nili t'l"''Y tJOtentiGli Ly . "'l:his alone c8 sts 
I ufficient lip;ht on the nature and nubstance of such pacts . '' 
uli ls ~c: tz - uch,T ( oland): 
eland st:-tcs her vieus alonp- "':.hr.> s''lle linn as those 
of .uusia end said that the resid n-t~ of th0 Unit d 
llrcad made it cle~,r that the ·.t)mic 'Jm b ·1ill be used . 
The signatories of the act tre undertaking ni li t~ry 
1easures of an enforcement naturs 1 ·ithout the prior 
authorization of the .JCC'-lrity Council . 
I 
has 
'l'he .t'c:;..Ct anJ the - oJ'e - 3erlin xis r,_re very similar both 
in forr.w.l construction "S well as in the claim that they are 
~repa ·ed ~nd adopted for defensive purposes . the ct is a 
violation o~ the ChL~ter and constitutes -a th~e~t to 1orld 
eace ·nd secui'ity . 
4: • • 
Hate : .l:'oints si·nilrr to th '"'e ::nacle by the repr::lsEmtati ves 
other foul' 'I'[ stern ''uT·opean stat0s nere made by Vasili 
'[l_rasenko of the u_ -rainian s . s . \ . nd Kuzma • • T isselev , of the 
ector 1 ceil ( United Kingdom) : 
'i'he United Kingdom mA.intained that the '-~ ~t is within 
the united ~8.tions Cha!.~ter , l"'ticle 51 . 11 Th8 tl. ntic .t'' ct 
is so patentl defensive in intention ~nd in character that 
only those \ .. ho contemp late rggression h"'ve any r c son to 
re..)ret th9.t Pact . '' 
':the United Kingdom discarded the vie·ws exp:r ss.od by 
ussia and asserted that nglo - boviet Treaty is still in 
existence but it '-ras "'eneralissimo )talin thqt declared that 
1it is no longer operative . 
'l'he text of the fact does not provide for military and 
air bases neither does it contein any secret natter or 
,pro tocols . 
Lexica and the people of . exico know Vihat is ha J ening 
in tJ.e unl ted States but the people o.f 1 orway do not know vrh'- t 
ts taking place within the Soviet Union ~nd across its border 
Hhich \'i£•s made clear• by Dr . Bo:'fmei ster "that ;,To do not knov 
and cannot knm' what is happenin:::; across thc<Je bo_ders . " 
So rluss ia by hor ovtn r ction c r·eP.tes sus0icion anc causes 
anxiety . 
1 r . uromyko knows that in democratic countries people 
ave ric:hts to speak and publish find ho buses his argument s 
the yoints that favour him the most out o.2 the newspapers but 
to realize th- t for each cli~ping fifty su~porting 
1contrar•y viewpoints could be produced . 
/_'b . 
n 
~he valor of the Bed Army has been dissipated by the 
.:::>oviet :rovcrnm-;nt and this produced the J orth ltl~~ntic ... E!_Ct . 
'l'he closer a government is to its peo_r;le the more 
dif.fi cult it is to declare Y:Ftr . i.odern democratic p'"'ople 
•Hill not decL"I'e war unless their ter'~itory is attac!;:ed first 
Ol' they are obliged to defend the _:)rinciple s o.f democracies . 
The Yact is not asgrossive . It is defensive in ch~racter and 
intentions . "No on0 can h:3vo any reason to fe2..r tho Fe ct if 
afiere s si ve intention is a 1•sent ~rom their policy . n 
_,ene ... ayer ( ~·ranee) : 
~he Nor th tl~ntic Y~ct is a treaty of friendship to 
develo,J cul [:,ural , social , econor1ical ties bot•feen the signa-
tories and military strength is to rr.ake them strong collec tive iLy 
lin order to attain security from an armed aggresslon . 
It is crc ~tcd due to abusive Uce of the veto power and 
this will discourage an aggressor . This '.dll take action 
!before the 3ec~rity Counci l has time to decide further action . 
'l'he countries concerned arg only exerclsing their :e i timate 
l
;l'ights o:C self - defense . 
The purpose of the . :'rnnco - ussian 'I'l'r;aty is the 
1unsia ::,nd F'rr:ncP against Germnny . 
Why f.r . r_rrom;yko should fer-r such a defensi V8 .1:'8.Ct 
n ho himself h''lS assured that Russia has no ·ish to 
eaten &ny of the signato,•ies? 
.:>oviet 1\us sia a lready has t·,;enty - thrc;e 
·I 
,, 
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fl 
net rorks of' tre,.,ties ith her satellites ,-hich a~"'e de:~.'cnslve 
in nature . 1 l so , -lu..mrnia , ugoslavia , ,ulc;aric and Al'oRnia 
h<-vo tr'Jo.ties uith ussia of mutual assistence i:!:' 'J.ny third 
party attacks an.r of the 1 ar cies to the e t1,..,a ties . All of 
these tr sties ~ere siGned from one to five years be~ore the 
si ning of the .~orth Atlantic .Pr ct • 
• C. Gundersen (ror;ay): 
'lhe 'orwcgian people heve no .·irmel, desir·o than to re -
build their country i:!'l .t-iea.c.- , freedom and independence . On 
the other ha.nd , they c nnot possibly close their eyes to 
their intei'na-cional Len3ion v·hich today dominates the ·orld 
scene or to the m11ny dam-=>ers · ·hich it cnt"' ils even for I or ·:ay . ~ ecent histo-... y hc..s t::o.ught that meT'e rPliance on isolation and I 
a firre desi~e 'or pP~ce does not ~r~vide su(nicient protection 
in the -,o-rlc of tod2y . 1 'hat is ·dlT , being in no doubt as to 
its p-=;:-:- c,_, ':'ul churacter , ,.oT"J r>.y has de cicled to join the . orth 
\.tlrntic r<>ct '7ithout heing subject 13d to any :t'ossure in any 
"';~1.r tsoever by the United States or any other po 'Or . 
1 .arren ... . Jiustin (United States): 
The p.-, ct is ·.i thin the frqme :ork or:' the United , c tions 
Charter like tne c >llective defence agreencnts 1ith the 
• "'!cri can Re ubli cs . 
The .Pact ,- cce.c;ts mutual unders t :ndin(;s :1nd do!'l.ocra tic 
principles of countries on oth sides of the _orth tlantic 
in o~aer to maintain a social , economical Lnd political 
stroility . The United States is ussisting on a very large 
scn.le because it knoY.rs th0 soundness and h8al th of 1..n•ope is 
necessrry for peace and secu~itJ to the people from the 
thro ts of intqrnotional Communism . 
47 . 
·arced to .-..ccept the pressure of Cor.rr.mnism ancl this proce s 
~houlcl not be continued . The fact is to ,ive secn""ity and 
~efend their independence nnd freedom . 
,, r . "':>:>oi'lylro conrJlainqd that R.us sia is isol. ted but 
is to be blamed for it'? 
In Jul.:- , 1947 ':.ussia was invit"'d to build Tnrope 1 s 
cconony but she !'efused . 1•'or cul tur'·l !1 elations since the 
biddle of 1947 she wnnts no contacts b t1een her 1 'ople and 
rest of the ··orld . 
In 1946 the United States offered her a mutual guarantee 
ttenty- five to forty ye>J.rs from the aocre.ssion of Jermany 
Jepan out she !'ofused it . The Cor.rrnunist seizure of 
!VZechoslovakia precr;ded the Or'Tiat:.on of the /estern union . 
Both t 11e rus'38ls 'l'reaty and the Torth Atl ntic .. act 
~ e againnt totalitarianism 11nd '11 om Communist ideology :hich 
J.s atteruotins to dest ry ...... rope . The ~o ·th. Ll'Ultic P.ct is 
directed &bainst otential 2 rr-ssors qnd no onv else . 
ussia has isolated herself from the )e~ceful _amily 
'of the \'orld. by not even joininr; the SD"'!CiRlized a encies to 
~articipBta in the orld . She no- beloncs to only two such 
"gencies out of thirteen . She is uelcome to join anytir.'lA she 
~ishes to join sincerely . 
The 10rth. tl ntic rEct is desl ned to safe uerd the 
. 1.tions duo to the lack of certainty and er:ecti V'9ness 
n the ..:>ecur•i ty Council and due to the t-::.buse of th.J .. rl vi lege 
4.0 . 
lof tbe veto ~0\'0r . 1lhis .rn ct ~ 
~Jrinciples of the United Jations 
s forned to safeguard the 
d thin the scope o::· the 
vhar·ter and to sa!'eguard the pur1:1oses and _Jrin~iples of the 
Char·ter . 
lote: Dr . ,icto!' ndres 'elaunde of eru , --renoral 
. ~ . L . 1 c au3hton of Canada ~nd Dr . •,duJ1Pdo ...... uleta of . ngcl , 
Colo~iliia s~oke in defence of the Pact . 
49 . 
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CI.AP'l':;"i IX 
J. E :;-,J:!..t CI'I01~ OF SOVIJ!/1' RU:.;3IA TO T'~ PACT1 
ere consicler2tion must be erlven to th0 entire 
_,us sian pro.)O;"'anda which is repetitious in itself . J.'he sign-
ing o: tho 1Jorth atlantic act offered an ideal op JOrtuni ty 
for 1. ussia to shov1 how the .. estern 1,orld is clan:t ing do·1'ill on 
her and her innocFmt prlnciples and hGrmless 11ethods . 
l·ropoganda maintained t'1.·1.t :1ussi8. was the only cou_ntry tht t 
believed in derJOcratic )rinciplos and that the North tlr-ntic 
act signatories .Iei'e tho nations believing in ir:oeriali~m . 11 
J!roved it in signing Pnd forr:ling such a Pact . 'lh~t \ussl~. 
·ouldl " 'raid of nas th2,t such a strong alli nco around her 
prevent her annexing atlantic }act countries now ,, s she h2.d 
done ~ith Czechoslovakia . T~refore , it ~as a check on 
Russia ' s further agsrossion whlch she did not like but she 
1 still made use of the 1 - orth •t tl~ nti c .!:'act for her ·;;ropoganda 
puq.Joses . 2 
1 
The Soviet 1Jhi te ?aper on the or·th 
Embassy of Soviet ?t.ussia , .vashington, D . 
9 
tlrntic .1act , 
c .' 1949 . --
-~ 11 ~i'ourteen bishops prove Alliance , " Christian Centui'"Jll, 
Vol . 66: 6~3 , ay 25 , 1949 . 
il 
_-.;:ussi& claims th"'t the Pact is "openly .g_J'es'3ive'' 
and urdos8ly directed at her . She ri~st criticizes the 
.estern Jnlon which laid the ~ound;.~tion for the Pact . She 
st,·tes that the basic Jhilosophy of the '.JeRtern Union was not 
_ble&ce _;ar'ticul'"'Tly in Europe and thR.t it lacked the st .. "e::.1.e;th 
to rraintain international peqce ~nd security . 
bis ~nion abandoned the :olicy of tho democ ·-tic 
countries uho v:ere anti - : i tler ~c::.'ld fought to;,e tl1.er .for one 
co' L •on caus•3 , i . e . the pe.~.ce Emd ha!)piness of the world . 
'rhe ~<?stern Jnion is P co1.n.plete change in the policies 
of the above countries ~nd contrary to the 8lta a n d rotsdam 
conferences . 'l'his union dis cards the IJ:'roa ties of I·'rienclship 
and l u tual Ass is t'.:'nce concluded by I us sir in 1942 1:i th Srer-..c t 
~ritain and vith ranee in 1344 . 
3he maintFins that she , as before , abides by the 
policies o Yalta q_nd Potsd".m -·ihile the powt:lrs of the '{estern 
I 
Union wish to dominate the •1orld . 'rhe h'i ve Pov1ers tact is nou1 
I 
set to keep liermany again fr'om being aggressive but against 
the ;States nhich were their allies in ~,orld .!ar II . ...ussia 
claims that it is indisr,utable , J.espite wh8.t the ·}ewers of the, 
/estern Union may say , that the main aim of the .!:'act is not 
the self- defense of these powers but to pool their armed 
and direct it against nussia . 
The alliance represents nilitary , political and econorrJp 
association which is b':ling cerried out by the Marshall lan . 
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circle a;:1d an Jmglo - t·unerican bloc - r4 bloc ".rhose aim ls to 
e: )and its o m s tra tegi c r ili tary nnd economic )osi tlons . '1'_"1'1 
I 
I 2ct is meant to dominate E'J.rope by an Anglo - American bloc 
I 
1due to their narrovi view of foreign ancl domestic ~;olicies . 
ThA JniteQ States is least interested in the ~olitical 
inc'_ependence find the economic devfllopments of Europe but is 
interested only in i n.perialisr11 c..nd the exploitation o t ese 
EurotJ · an count.,..,ics Mnd ma -ing them r-mti?:'ely depenclent u_ on hen . 
Rus ,.,ia _ urther points out that the ever- increasin ""'; 
demands J.'or gre& t arraie s and mlli tary expenditures undermine 
chances of further stable advances in th, countr· · es of 
lthe .estern Union . t the sarte tlme it makes it hard to 
create a sound )Oli tical concli tion within these individual 
stutes . 
ftussia says that she is the only country where real 
democr·atic ..1:-rinciplcs are in force and is on ·'.:;he ro~ d of 
steady and rapid econoric rohabilit"l.tion . Sho is also the 
I 
champion in consolidatinr; the de!11oc.,.,"'tic foundations ·-i th a 
political unity a:rnong those nations that have emancipated 
themselves from reactional'y and oppressive rec·imes . 
It is strange , she sa "'"s , th8.t these cou:-1tries of' the 
1
• este!'n Lfn1on have already set up a military co:rn_"!littee vith 
I , 
.r• ield .arshal i.tontgor:tery as head of it without proof that 
t~ere is the slightest chance that these countries are in 
danger of an attack from an outside source . 
'l'his all r.~oes to show that tho .!estern Union has no 
32 . 
wish to ~aintain the peace but to create the Anglo - Awericqn 
bloc by giving pooplc war hysteria , by bearing prAssure in 
• •uropean countries - r:estern Germany among them - and by 
speeding up enlistments along with false publicity . 
The Ues tern !Jnion iderc s are intervYoven "''i th the :::orth 
I 
•, tlrntic act with the plans for the violent establishment ofj 
I~ ne:_jlo - , meri can ·,wrld supremacy under the aegis of the United 
0t2.tes . 
It is to be noted here how the ~ussians have dev8loped 
the idea of 'Wrld domine.tion by an nglo-A1'lerican bloc and 
how they are non develo~ing it in the ~orth AtlPntic act 
which is now to be consillo "ed :~rom their point of view . 
'lhe United States 1vill play the main role in 
establishing policies to dominate the entire .. estern ::;uropean 
g.rou_Jing along with Groat 1~i tain . 
'l'he United States says that in order to ~Jromote a 
·world wide sco}le she was justified in the Inter - American act 
and the ~'"ithmtic .!?act is advanced as the chief instrument o.f 
this policJ which is cont:;:•olled by the ruling clrcles of the 
United States . 
The United States tries to justify her action by sayin 
•th"t the North AtLtntic Pact is a r ional aereoment on the I 
matter of security . Every ... me knows that the countries in the 
ract are not threatened by any aggression which proves the 
falsehood of the United Stat8s which cannot vrait untll the 
United l!atlons Organization becomes sufficiently strengthened . 
53 . 
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The Dc:artment of Strt~ aid not venture to come out 
and say O).Jenly the 2.nti - o..:J viet rd.ms to pros .rvo world ~ ublic 
o 1~inion but resorted to such n. r.1ean political strug le , s the 
1 orth . tlnntic ract . 'l'he prepara "Lion and dri vo ok the ..tact 
distinctly a desire of world dominatlon by the nglo-
merican bloc . 
The ruling circles of the United States , rho arc in 
a bloc ith Great ,ritain, dominate both sides of the tl ntic 
thus the t m hemis~heres vrhich confirms the desire Ol the 
_nLlo - merican bloc to dominate th8 world . This desire .. as 
advocated by Churchill at the confer··ence in Fulton , • issouri 
resided over by r~sident ':'ruman . 
Is it not '.iorld domination , instc d of r-3 ional 
agro .~ants , \~on the Jnited States is tryin; to form a 
cdi torranean Union or East l .. edi terr:?n"'lan Pact 1hi ch is being 
discussed? .::>uch plans are c_eftting more and i ore "'eplrate 
grOU.lJS under the leaclershi_J of the Uni.tecl t rrtes and Great 
oritain ·.-;hich is a clear indication of their esire to dominate 
~11 ~arts of the g lobe . 
ussia noH hit.., U_tlon the idea of g1·ouping oouth "'"'f:st rnl 
,Asia which \I as co:mmenced at the confe~ence in Delhi , India I 
undel..., the p!'etex o discussing Indonesian questions . '.t'he 
'imperialistic attitudes or certnin loadll'lg persons in the 
as.ective goverrun~nts -i ll not receivs the consent of the 
si • !I 
'--====~==========~====~-===============~======-~~====~~===-~~ 
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By the above st<.:tenent it seems that Russia has or 
underst _ds to have a do'inc..tin[; hand in the r1.ass of the 
eo_t)le because she clearly indicates above that the people of 
sia will not give their consent . 
1ithout much d.L'ficult.'! it can be seen hov; , under the ii 
I 
I 
small states by tellinc them to im)rove their ec~nomic conditi~ns 
dollar• policJ , the United States is tryine; to dominate the 
and by injecting the idea of a potential az,e,ressor in t,ussia . 
ussia syas that the ruling circles of the United Statols 
and Great r·i tain are tryinp~ to de:';JI'i ve many other states froJ 
!pursuing an indo)endent f'or>eign and domestic policy "hich is 
not a poli cy of the U. s . S . R. 
Jlwho 
Russia elsa points out the r:J.iscalculn_'Lion of the 
are against her by saying that they thought 3.ussia ,-ould 
colle.pse r::.ftor tho second hrld !Jar due to her ecn-r)_omic 
conditions and domestic troubles but the ca:lJi talist countries 
now believe how wrong they ·were . 
'l'ne Department of State is novl saJing that the United 
jstates tried for three years uith the U. S . S . _i . to secure 
so_ae coo .::.eration betneen them vvhi ch is no thing but a false 
J statement to justify its _;>osition reearding the :-orth tlanti~ 
fact . 
The nglo - American bloc ..Ls trying ever;n',rherc - the 
I 
N:r~h Atlantic , South A-r'1erica , the ruedi tcrrG.nean , Asia nnd 
.lrlca - wherever they can re2-ch to dominate the world . 
Russ ia maintains that all the countries ~ill not join 
these gr·oupinss and those Hho have already join8d will not 
unconC:.i tionally submit to unr~lo -Ameri can domin·1 t5.on . 
Countries in the Orient \d1ere national li~eration ~as 
just started Yii ll not join such grou .. ings and Pinall ', the 
oviet Union and the peoples democracies v·hich :::.·-.e carrying 
true \Jill and the ~Jrinciples of equality lind fr"i.8ndship ·· i th 
regard to other nations can nevor ap~rove of such grouping s . 
ussia has no ··ish to domin~?.te the Horld like these 
grou_Jings \"Thich are no different 1'rom the principles of the 
'l'he nglo - merican bloc and in particular the United 
:st~- tes is deciding upon 2nd ~Jlannin.e; mili t['ry budgets nnd 
stablishing air and nnval bases in all ~arts of the earth 
pl ... ~ns to use atom bon:bs to destory mankind . 
The United : ations has cond.emned the use of nrooar·anda 
the United States is t.cyine; to create uncertainty among 
eople of the viOrld by the press and through statesmen 
o are henchmen of the United States against a peace - loving 
like oviet .ussia . 
'].'hey &re doing this becatF'e they cannot solve their 
omestic problems and they realize that the problems can only 
e solved by the violence of another war . 
!hen the econd .!orld ar was over the United States 
began to establish her naval and air bases even 
miles avmy from her country both in the Atlantic 
The number of ·,:ar bases instead of being reduced 
r:~ 
,_)l) . 
I 
v;ere multiplied , both in the Eestorn and \:es tern hemis.J:-'heres , 
in ~urove , the count~ies of America , Asia a nd Africa and ~ere 
jp laced parti cularly close to the boundaries of Russia for the 
convenience of attacking Hus sia . 
__ m;: can any reasonable person believe thn. t this Fas 
all done to nrote ct the United States? It was clear after the 
Second wrld Jar that there was no danger for that nation . 
,fuJ have the United Stqtns and Great ritain ~ept their 
combined chiefs unless they are plannine new aggress:.ons ? 
If no ylans exist0d then there \roul~ be no need for those 
Russia v.rants to know why :merican troops ar·e now 
stationed in __;urope and sia cl.nd continue to be stationed in 
all the countries who are members of the United i ations l"lhen 
Jthey are not needed except for occupational tasks . The rulin 
I circles of the United States are mel'::ing a habit of continuing 
to send tr>oops to •'urope and China under the pretext that silch 
!movements are necessary to )I'ote ct the United States . Such 
'a ction has nothing to do i th peace sho..-:s merely a plan for 
age;ression . 
flhe United States is preparing J couan A.nd .'estern 
Germany as their tools for agercssi ve nature by post1Joning 
peace treaties -,d th these two countries . 
ri'he United States is trying to interfere Ylith domesti c 
matters in Czechoslove.lda End Greece because these countries 
were trying to curb the reactionary circles in their nations 
·. 
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and be c2use they Cl id not wish ·to support an Anglo - A.rQeri can 
bloc . 
The United StE...tes "'Del the Anglo - iJI1erican bloc have not 
given any cooperation to lussia ~ nd the United StatAs is 
pursuing a policy in trade to exclude Hussin. co~plote l .'T . 
58 . 
'l'he 1 orth tL_ntic .Pact is not the idea of people like 
Churchill and Bevin but of many other lon calibre men of the 
rulin;; circles of America ~nd the •. nclo - .rn::erican bloc is d'3si ed 
!only to c..ominate the "forld and to achieve their selfish, mean 
and in_rmman interests . It is a policy of aggression and the 
crc<ll..ion of another war . 
Joseph V. Stalin has s;:dd , 11 T'he horrors of the recent 
v:ar are still too fresh in the memory of the peoples and the 
!JUblic .£'orca.s "avouring pes.ce ::::.re too st--.ong :or Churchill's 
pu-=- ils in ag ,ression to -,e able to overpower' them and to turn 
towE...rd a now \!ar . 11 
ARi S AFD THE YQR'l'l:l A':PL 'fi C FACT 
,;ithout arms this tr0aty has no bac:Vbone . In arming 
~urope the ;:n:o jor- 1urden '"ti l l rest u ;on the Uni tr;d. Sta t0 s . The 
~rms uould cost 1 . L_; billion doll9rs . 1 As to ho~r tho United 
btates 'Jill distribute the m'ms to its sle;natories is not clPa 
~-S yet . 
Hll the members of' the ract ar'e c?.sking more than the 
Jni ted t2.tes can supply and this r1ay not be acceptable to the 
Vni ted 0tates Congress . 2 t:,very signatory of the Fact exce_,_::>t 
Canada is asking for arms at this sta~e . 
'l'he concept of the five pouors is to avoid s.nother war 
n their lands and now ror>7ay , .uenmark , Iceland , .~. ortugal , 
tal] , Gr'eece and Turkey have to .nave arms . 
So fa:z:o no parti cular pl,qn has been worked out , at least 
_as not boon macte oubli c . All of the nations 1·rould like to 
)rev,~nt -::.n invasion of their own soil and they ar•e all loolring 
o the United 3tat~s to support them . 
It has not been possible to ~no~ •iliat strat~gic role 
~he Scandinavian coun.tries 
concerned members . It has 
shall play or for that matter other 
not been dr;cided as to how the 
I 
1~~eech of ·acretary of StPte 0ean Acheson, ~ditorial 
."n the Christian Science . onitor , (Boston) , .ipril ?3 , 1949 . 
I 2 
forc?s shell be mobilized and how they shnll be coln.nanded . 
bhould they "';)e corni"lnnded by Vis count · on.tgor: ery or by an 
·"·•m.erican General and iNhere headquarters for military purposes 
shall be is still a question . 
I 
It is ~ossibl that they may set up separate grouJings 
of the .·ol"'th Atl~:~ntic J:'act sir;natories , for instance , a 
3candinavian group or a Modi terranean gv·oup ·which nay be under 
a joint staff . 
E.urope ".78.nts to build its ground forc3s ui th heavsr 
I 
aerial support . Ent;lr-nd is n.sking fo,.., hoavy bo:r.1bers and nRval 
eq.uip:ment from •'ranee . The bulk of the reouests p-,e for tanks , 
field artillery , mortar's , small arrn.s , automotive equipment , 
land mines , u.nlforms , aY(IJnuni tion , anti - :?..irc:_"aft guns , 
1ele ctroni c R.nd corJ12'nuni cation eguipnent , i"ir.;hter planes , .Lightetr 
'bmt!.bers , li6ht bombers , fast reconnaissance aircre.ft and bombs 
and armaments for them . 
0ecretary of dtate Dean cheson asked for 1 . 13 billion 
1dollars for the first year and it is well estinated that it 
:ill cost th e United Stotes at least twenty billion dollars 
in the cor.1ing years . 
The united States Administration ho~~es to use some of 
its surplus or gi vo ran m8~ tr:rial to ::-"embers to Jroduce 
individu2.lly .for joint action . 
It is reported that the United States has an unbalanced! 
military surplus . For instEnce , the United States has enough 
60 . 
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90 ..• L anti - aircx'aft guns that '"rould suf'fi ce the need of two 
:huncll'ed divisions but just enough motorized roed grE•.ders and 
twelve foot mortars , BOOd for only twenty- five divisions • 
.t'here are on hand about forty - one divisions sets of equipment 
but that is .c;ood for nnl:v trienty- tb:r-ee divisions . Lost of the 
I 
baterial that is in surplus in the United Sts.tes 
lover - hauling or needs mod0rnization and repair . 
is in need of 
To hand over 
such material to the members of the ract v!i l l be a crave 
istake . 
The United States wants to have its orm twenty- five 
I 
~ i visions of _ rmy o.nd civilian force Rnd the eighteen comp:B te 
sets of mc..terial lVhich th0 Uni t0d St1tes has in surplus ·vill 
e neede ..... for its mm use . If those ei.ghteen sets 2--re given 
members of the P!lct then she must rcplflco them sooner or 
ater . 
There is a dem~nd for jot planes but the United States 
~as no surplus at all of them . There are some excess naval 
~ircraft and naval units for trPnsfer . 
rl1he United t;ates rill not rob its mm tor-ces to 
rovide modern 1uarfare equipment to the members of the Pact , 
e , either they shall be ::nanu.factured in the United 
tates or abroad . 
The signatories are no1 co~sidering seriously the 
tanclardi za tio:n of ar"'ls in order to hnve t'J.e r1axinu...m 
.fficiency and pro·oortionate contr·:i.bution in the manufn.ct urin 
I 
II 
of 3 er:~ms . 
If the A~lantic P"ct security ~rogran is put into 
action the pro osed '1 , 1 30 , 0 0 , 0 10 is a dron in tho ocean . 
It c~sts ?vO , OOO,OOO to equip one armored divi ion gnd to 
eq_uip forty divisions is so· ~thin;; orth thinl::ing about . 
.. hatever it costs , this Tould again e only t.1.e be~innin~ as 
the LJni ted t..., tes could hardly as.'3ume thfl t _ ussia ilould. sit 
still on her sic~e of the 11 iron curtain11 ""lhile the si na t.:>ries 
.J.Jroceed in a leisurely manner to build up a de.:'ense capable 
holding their presently available striking force . 
ctually , all the ~uss ians ~ould have to do double 
their present imnediate striking po1er vould be to bring up 
another .L'i ~ty existing dl vi s:i.ons from whe1•ever they are at 
l
l-resent stat~oned in tho Soviet Unlon . If they did that, 
the si~natories 1 defense force 7ould R;ain have to be 
I 
prooortionQtely stron~thenrd . ~ven this art of calculation 
1- • ~ 
IIould only . ·,n"'!'.- out satisfactorily i.f the Ll.J.ssians did not 
hit U_tJOn the br•ight idea that maybe they had bettor "Bt the 
uholo t_1.ing over v·i th befoi.·e the siBnatories had time to build 
,1 
up any def8nse at all . · 
3 !Je r _ork IJ:.'imes , ~~pril 24 , 1 949 . 
4 James • v1Q.rburt; , Statement to United States Senate 
Cownittee on ~orelgn plqtions on the Jorth Atl~ntic Security 
ro Jram, .. ay 10 , 1949 . 
l 
ecretr>.ry of Defense Johnson eX.:.JL'essed the o·,inion 
Lh'.lt the three fundam0ntals of prep-=redness are manpo\;er , 
!natcrials Pnd sui table ,.)osi tions from Vlhich to emplo~r them 
I 
:in the event o:· attacl . 'l'he Treaty sup9lics manpo\'er ['nd 
[ 
tr ate ~1 c I' o s 1 t ions • Any lack ·ould be of -"" teri al re(luire d ~~ 
or de_'ense . do\'ever , som8 of the reouir-?.d material may becom 
.vailable over the next few yePrs as by- products of economic 
;eocov0ry through the 1 'lrshall lan . If the Jni ted States ;·.;as 
to stL'engthen the line of de£'ense in Europe and elsevrhere it 
rust _:.Jrovide the signatories v:i th arms and eq_uipnent and 
~cbuild the .estern co:r~muni t:J in building a bul·-i<rk against 
I 5 ac;gression . 
.tl. t the sRme time , t..-eneral .Brn.dley , Chief of .:>tr,!' f of 
the United dtates ~rmy , stated in sinilar vein by stating that 
there was no better basis of comnon defense than the mutual 
confidence of t'."el ve nations and urogress · i th added security . 
1
'l'lle United States is hel ing the signatories politically by 
strengthening their 'fil l 8nd institutions . !"urther , the 
'combined poJulation of the sie~natories of three hundred 
I 
~tillion peogle is an i~ortant milit['rJ factor in the event of 
5 .:::~e c:::>ete1·y of Defense Johnson , _-J.earinc;s befo ·e the 
Co~ittee on LOreiLn {elations , united 0tatrs Senate , Slst 
Congre3s , l'art I , Lay , 194 ::/ ,p . 117 . (1tw rorth Atl.ntic 1l.1 r'3atyl) I ---- -- __ ___, 
I 
J 
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another war . Iheir combined steel production in 1948 is 
estimated at 37 , 0UO , OCJO tons Y:Thilo the United States produced 
89 , 000 , 0UO and their ability to manmacture the wea::)ons of 
Wf-lr as Jell as the basic living cor.1rrodi ties of peace are 
i:m._,_ ort2.nt cont_"ibutions to the se curity of the ,,estern ·~:orld . 
rr . enry Wallace expressed himself by sR.ying that the 
poli cy of containment has already :failed in China ana there is 
no end to the billions the 0nited States shall have to spend 
,in ·.iest3rn .2.urope . The United States has a.lready spent 
I ~>1 , 000 , 000 , 000 in the 11 cold viartr to cl,"~te by depriving the 
peo_.;le at home who need housing , slum clearance , cheaper 
povmr for farms and industry , development of groat river 
valleys , hospital s and s choo l s , better social scc11rity and 
these losses ar'e nothing compored to greater losses to come 
as the :full impact of the arms proGram is felt . The re - armill§ 
of .~estern .:!.Urope vmuld cost ~t'30 , 000 , 000 , 000 at the minimum . 
It would mean compulsory draft , strict control of manom'er , 
·~lallace pointed out . He a l so stated that this r1.ay be one way 
7 
of eliminating unemp l oyment but an insane one . 
6 Tonaral Omqr ~radley speaking on fhe rorth Atl•ntic ' 
'r~r~at~-, ... -o~.r·inf~S bAfo:>e thP Corr_mittee on '?re~gn.1el8.~ior_;s ~ I 
Unltc.a .::>tauPS ~enn.te , 8lst \_,on~,r.=::ss , ( "'Slln~-con. Jn"\..ter. St,q1 s 
rrinting Office , 1949) , P2rt I , p . 286 , 1 
7 T~enry lallPce , SiY"aking on '!:he 2or~l1 Atlrmtic rrreaty , 
ITcarings befo-ne the Committee on oreign -~o la L.ions , ~.-'n~ ted 
18tates Sen·1te , Slst Cone;r":lss , ( .. ashine;ton: United :,tates 
~ove~nrnent rrinting ~fice , l '49 ), !art I , pp . 426 - 429 . 
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CLA '1ER 'I 
T E _O~TH A~LA TIC PA~~: I TLI'I'A _ li.LLIA1 C.:. 
Do the p~o le of the Lnited St~tcs believe that the ay to 
scc1_re la~t:Lns per-ce is to bind. t eMsclves in o. milit'lry 
c.lliancc 'Ii th the nations of est rn ~urope "nd to serve notice 
tnat any ag ·ression a alnst these nntions \"ill m?an 
1 Do they believe that security and stability 'Jill be 
·restor>ed to the 1."Testern ·orld by ,:uaranteein£; the territorial 
inte 0 rity of eleven other nations , nost of them stratot:;ically 
locStted a_·ound the perimeter of vor:..mnist ~urope? 
l. Do they b~~ieve that the Co:r:n11unist tnr·eat in countries llke ··ranee , .L lialy and Germany can be met P..nd re_,elled by ·e ~..~uiL.in._. th""; .rnies of those countt•ies as units in a gr"nd 
alliance , finc.ncea. , armed And very l? rgely cmTLrnanded by the 
nited ut tes? 
Do they b lieve th~ t the tir:-1e hns core to ·.·rite off the 
united rtions as ~ :ailure and to b1rn back to the bal nee 
f o~er sJstem in ·orld relations?l 
~rhe above au~stions n:;:•e ruestions on thG l-0r'th tl ntic 
~act . It 'ill be -::'or the best t1rt those quest"ons c.re 
nsuered . 
Boon merican p0oplc in articular 1m t ~e nc .o to 
ealize that their nation hHs been brouL;ht to a cnoice as 
'ateful os --ny in its history . 
This means that the United tates will lAave its role 
1Edito~ial in The Ghristian Cent'rv, · "rch 00 , 1949 . 
of st2..nding bet\7een liSia and !:uro1;.e , free i::1 its relation to 
both, to oe annexed to '-'urope . It will 8.lso nullify the 
universal oblic.ra tions of the 0ni ted States w·hich sha he.s 
undertaken in the United lations . rrhis v;ill banish the 
rcoional concerns she h2.d for "' cAntury in Lsia nnd join t 11.e 
fs.te o_ this natj_on vith the dyin e:·1pires of -... italn , -r~.nce , 
__ ollanc_ , /'lgium rmd 1-'o:..~tufal . 
'rhe orth Atltmtic fqct is a hard and frst !1ilit"PY 
'alliance to uhich it is exp9cted that twelve nations ·;ill 
subscribe . Its main concept is that these n•-ttions \"ill t:ceat 
an attack on the terri tory of ~my on9 of them as an <1 ttack up 
all of the~ . 3uch territory could be tho ~~ench de~artnents 
of ~orth -~rica • 'l'hen there is the 1Jrovi sion for "consul ta ti 
.-1 th im_.liecl cmr..rnon action even in esse of intern'!l uprisings 
or thre"'.ts to the colonial h:::Jlclings of any of the sign;;torics . 
Article 4 and 5 of the Forth Atl~ntic fact ~re 
sui'i'i ciently ambi[;uous to allan for endless maneuvers befOI'e 
the day of e.ction and endless r crimine.tion . Article 5 , uhi 
II 
is su_1_ osed to 'be tho big th:>:>eFt to a Russia lrnt on c.r-fc:res'3ion , 
is loosely enough lorded to mB._~e it ossible for ~ny r1'3""1ber 
of the alliance to avoid resort to armed force if it does not 
rticle 4 is d~lib~ratAly drawn so 
that it can be made to ::nean much or little , as the immediate 
interests of the signatories may seem to dictate . If oritain 
and ~"ranee hold by their alliances vri th :8-ussia ( !' s they say 
in ~rticle 8 that they do not) th0n the dinlomats can be 
::>) . 
I( 
I 
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counted on in future tim'"s of crisis to make the slippery 
langua~e or these col'l!.J.itnPnts .~ccomodnte themselves to any 
dosi~ed national ~olicy . 
eve l ation o~ tho terms of this P~ct came 8fter a 
se_ ies of ... em :!.'kable last minute maneuvers . _·'irst , Italy 1!as 
invited to be cone one o f the orie:;inal si,c;ners . Se c ond. , 
I 
~ortugal was elso invited "nd third , 'lcmmark was invited :.cfterl 
have acra0d , in consultat on 
I 
r foreiun minister r~s re~ortod to 
I 
Jashington, to a permanent reactiv~tion of tho 
airfields in Gl' e--;nlPnd . So the desip1 b0 1.ind the 
i ,.ct of securinc; <dv8.nc:ecl airb'lses rom Y"hich to trn"'ottle 
lr,us sia '.JUs m::::tde more c l ear . 11 
3ecretary 1 cheson spent 111uch of his time, ·.7hen 
'pr~sentint:; the alliG.nce , insistinc of its defensive nR.ture and 
e:;:coriatinc.;> ~.ny other vievr . ! .. 1• . 0 evin did the same ~rhen he 
disclosed it to tho )ritish l iament . This -ras all child-
ish . The matter was not what the text says , but \vhat the 
~1.ussia:cJ.s think . B.S John :F'oster Dulles said at Clevel·nd : 
Any c .. lliE.nce nhich includes n2..tions located as close to 
.us sian terri to 'Y as a1•e or'.ray nnd Denm&rk is bound to be 
~egarded in lussia as a threat . 
On. ebru::ry 20 , J8J:les Reston contj_·ibuted a long 
1article to the Hevr York 'l'imes i!hich is s.n imJort,nt aPticle 
llshm•inz vrhether the Pact is actu .. lly d.ofensi vc or otherwise . 
t seems that Lr . ,eston has a good access to the 'Jepnrtment 
f State and h2.s been repo:"'ted as spending much of his time 
6'3 . 
quietlJ '.lith the Sec:2etary of State . The articl e states that 
11 certain 12eas of Europe v;ero vi tal to our sec, ·i ty'' and 
mqrica should rovide th~ir do:ense but t~en the military 
men took over ·1i th their conception ths.t '>7e 2re tryin~ to 
create P.. ilit'l~'"J combin<-ttion so stron;::; , so .. ml l a·•nec"'.. and so 
\·ell su~J~ lied '.'i th :<ctual and ~ot~!lti l bases 'i thin strikin--
th::: Soviet Union that the .t'oli tbu·•o in r osco 'l 
Hould not C.are to risk Pt;-·ress'Lon . J.'he 1'1ili tary men 'Non A.nd 
they in:listed that 1 orwr>..y , Italy anC::. Iortugal be included . 
If the above is the truth con8 rnin the inner n"t.u1:'e 
!of the -'Ret .~s it has been :·inully .... ·o.,..,med , is not the inescap2 )le 
conse "'..lence that .. oscar" s nili tary men may be expected to 
nd that they shall be pernittecl. to m~ke such count .... rmovos 
roc:uire l to neutralize the b se-c.c _uirin.s moves of 
!, shin._s:ton ' s mili t~u· ~ men? And ·1ore will this sort of thing , 
tmili ta.:.."s ::nove ~"nd counterno'· , eventuJ'.lly l q_nd tl1e pea ... lc? 
ili tr -.~ mAn +.ell that the 11 zan~ of J'"' fety 11 al· ·ay~ 
no eels anoth'-'r pact . to the orth Atl nti c 
"ct . _··r'iYJ.ce' s I• or'Ji,:n Lini s ter has alrsady told his 
parliament that the 1.o:;_~th Atl ntic Pact must be bolst0red by 
a edi ter ... ·. nean act . Lr . c . L . Sulzborger , Chief of 
predi ctod that the .. odi terrane an act "roul d lead to a 1:icldle 
ncl the s~une week , ....>r i tain , 1 e\1 Zeal and and 
~mstPalia c~imed at a 11 .t'- cif'ic act" Ylhich the Australian 
I ~efense .~nister said uas like the Porth AtlPntic act . Thrse 
I 
thin:::,s 'L'e leading to the foPging of another steel ring 
a::."'ound _ ussia . It is the so·:10 p2.ttern that has brou;ht 
cc.la..m.i ty on rnan:!rind in the ~irst and Second ;'lorld \ ars . This 
li s all bound to rob the United ·:ations of' its last bit of 
value . 
'l'he fear of Russ ian exp<omsion , vrhich has creLted this 
1 Jorth J ... tl·~nvic .t'act , is also based on the :f)remise that the 
United ations cannot check this expansion . The United StQtosl 
I 
1vnl l exhaust the other mem )ers of the North t-~.tlantic ~act 
I 
i~utting strength into such ro~ional Plliances long befo~e the 
!l ast linlc in this chain of steel has been forged . 'rher'e are 
!reasons to believe that desperate Russians , wl1.om the nations 
1of like intere"ts and principles are tr ing to ush into a 
corn':lr , io'li ll break out some'rhere and this ·vill m~an total -.~ .... r . 
T:..,~rgve Lie , .SecretRr;y- -en"'ral of '·-he Unite J.rttions 
s repeatedly T.mrned that rc~i.onal pacts must be suboi' ·ina ted 
n fact not merely in .;·ord to the authority o~ the United 
If they a_·e not to \Vre clc that body then that must be 
e . ·'he 110rth f tlanti c !-'act it,norcs rlrti cle 03 of the 
;Ja tions Charter and shows that it means virtually to 
that body . This Pact ret-n•esents a fina l return by the 
iestern nations to the balance of pov1er poll tics Hhich is 
to the conce:Jtion of vorld organization . 
It h""=s been seen that a military alliance lilm the 
63 . 
.• orth rttlantic ?act is going back to the conc8ption o.f an 
inte:i.~na tional orbanization that f lways failed rnd never 
worked out • ell . It is :eared that history rill ~epeat 
itself once mo~e . 
'l'he po :cr irr:oli cations of the 1:: ct for the United 
.::.to. tes o..:e uell de_'-i_ncd by : . ..:-' . John Foster Dull<3s as he 
asserts tlwt the Paet Toulcl c:;_•(~~te unity from the natural 
grou'Jing having much in corm1on . 'l'his Treaty means th~t tho 
United St tes will not find uays and moans to g o to ~~r but i~ 
I 
an a_,gressor vris~1.es to mt:Lko 1'Jar the D.ggr'::!ssor vi ll have to 
fight not onl.~ the Unitec.. States but all the signatories . 
!Thus , the Jni ted States will use combined manpo::er , mater·ial 
and strate0 ic locations . Though at the initial stages a war 
jmay cost money :=tnd arms fi'om the United States this cou::o.try 
viill be aole to save many of its citizens lives and the 
I 
nation fro~ co~:1plete peri l and devDstation . t the pro sent 
time the United States rrill give the rnucb. needed moral 
support to ~rope and ~reserve their .free institutions and 
tal~e anay the fear of Russian a_::;gression . 2 
2 John ."ester Dulles s~)eaking on The l.orth t tlant ic 
lr _,Gty , __ of:lrings b:;fore the Cow_mi ttce on "oreip-n '1clations , 
United 3tatos Sen,:•te , Slst ~~ongress , ( [Qshington: United 
~tates rinting Office , H149) , h.rt II , .PP . 340- 357 . 
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American vital inter•ests necessitate th-t in the event 
j any member of the Pact is att:-> eked the United Sta tss Ylill do 
sonothing quite drastic but tho Constitution prevents her in 
defining her exact role . howevoT' , the action ',7ill de}.;end 
UJ.-)On logic , vital interests and circumstances . 
1\ight at this stage it will be im•:;os,sible for ~ ussia 
to over- run :?ranee or the ""etherlf'nds 11vi thou t involving war 
with the United States due to the )r'3sence of American troops 
in that area , 
America has made it clear that Am.eric8n gu rantqe is a 
deterrant against invasion but no ~)rotection in an.j other 
form despite such a guarantee if invF.l.sion should occv.r . 
It is vmrth while to exanino .rresidunt Trumo.n 1 s words : 
1 
11 If ..-re can make it sufficiently clear in adv.smce that any 
armed attack would be met with overwhelning force the armed 
attack might never occur . " 
,/hat does he mean by s::~ying , 11 would be met by over -
whelmj_ng .force?" Does it mean th::-t if :'~orwo.y is attc1.cked the 
United Ststes would rush over to ~Tor''Iay and. dr1ve out the 
co~'11Eon enemy? 
1-"di to rial in 'rhe Conmom::reF.l.l , Vol . XLIX, 
3:9-4!9 . 
o . 21 , l. qrch 
ll 
.I 
I 
I 
steel mills . Consressional ap_>roval of the St . La••renco 
3oauay :..~nd est&blishment of the povTer pl'"'nt at Intern2..tional 
-•'alls ·-.rill nnt tal:c place for oui to some time 2.n.d that would 
enable Can.ada to manu.factm:'e sone arms to send them to _._o_,urope . 
This ract will no··i encourage 1 ussia to t"· 1re more strictl 
steps in maintaining her po··1er . Ilaybe she \"'ill ""lSt8blish a 
cor~eting s y stem incl~ding China . 
nr.J.erica nill have to supyly the arms to other nations 
and at least take the major burden of the .C'a ct but she c.s.nnot 
suyply in v~:~st quantity unless a standardization is m~-"de in 
all of the countries \•Thich is not an easy task . I f this is 
r 
done then. they must include all other nations in the present 
An.glo - nerican milita:.,y staff • .Jestern powers must consult 
I vd thout creating anv mistakes that would Y'lc>.ke them lose "ny 
j of their mer:J.be:::>s , othei''.-rise , it ".'ill barricaclo futu1.,e pro;_;res • 
'l'he public rea.ction has been of mixed feelings . \T 
•) 
and large the majori t;r of the American p.-;ople didn 1 t care 
be cause -~hey vTero not seriously intere ~ted . "11he public 
os~ecially is not keen in the technical asp0cts of tbe 
alliance but as a n8.tion the feelings were that anything to 
stop hus sia r'rom further aggression vms fine and just . .!hen 
the people re.alizecl that the North . tlantic Jact \"as sUJ:-')osed 
to sto~ any such ctggrossion, it satisfied them . The question 
I 
, uppermost in the minds of most peop l e is how much is the 
'=> 
act soing to cost? ~ 
-------
2 E . :I:. . Lindley , 11 lllit~.r.r 1id and t:i1.e 2.ct , ' _e\JSVleelf, 
Vol . 3~ , - ay ~ ' 1 949 , p . 2o . 
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C AP'l'ER III 
LI~ITATIONJ ON STrl -~~viC LOC-~I01S 07 
01-Cr I 1 TL rl iC P CT 
rl'he:t'e is no doubt that th3 five J:~~e1 :-crs of the ~Jeste:.."n 
Union rep2.··esent the hi::-{:hest devr.lo~)rrent of uropee .. n culture 
and standard of 1 i.ving a .. nd are foremost among the 11 fr.ee" 
Jn2..tions o_· .t:uro~Jo . These five nations of the ''est-~rn Union 
( elgi 1..1.m , 'rqnc:; , Luxembourg , the ~·other lands "nd Gres. t 
I 
J..:..ri tain) also ,-;e_'e the leaders in tbe dev3l01.rlent or de:..-:locratic 
I 
r,; rinclples . 'I'hey also bore rmch of the brunt of the late :;qr . 
IThe restoration of ~urope , in order to put it on its pre - uar 
lev::;l in ·wrld affairs , depends to a great extent upon these 
nations solvins their post - war probler1s an( LUrther keeping 
th:dr independence . These nc..tions cannot accom~Jlish t_loir 
goal -:~ithout nny economic aid and assistance in armanents . 
~ssentiolly these countr·ies form a core of any plan 1'or 
collective security . They believe in the :orth Atlantic F-act 
as a ~ractic~l pro cedure in order to keep them secure and as 
n.n instrW11cnt to maintain pence in an insecure vwrlcl . 1 
1
.1inston Churchill, 'j_'he torth Atl"'nti c ':'reaty 
(....,ritish I~'or:nw.tion Services , ,~e 'erence Jivision, I . D . 923 , 
~'ay , 1949) , )p . ll-12 . 
-The lJni ted Sta t8s Depnrtra:=mt of f3ta te c.nd the 
mbassadors of the .!estern Unio:;J_ nations cave 17\Uch thought 
I 
re;ardin'-' the lo ~i cal limits or msnbe::f•ship in the ?r ct . 
believed th:: t a larc:o grou_. of nations in the All i anco vrould 
ezert e;ree..ter -.-;eight and ~restise but the larger t:2e sroup 
the more internal disagreements •;;hi ch ,,roulcl tend to weaken 
I 
.the purpose . Therefore , the essPntial considc~ation of 
of membershiD '7as given to the nations that had strate<:;ic 
gGo::;raphic!ll positions , pro::r.:ini tJ to the So ·iot Union , econowic 
potonticlitics , militarJ strength and sound character of 
1 . t . l . t . t t . <) ~0 l lC 0 - lnS l U lOlls . ~ 
Canc.da. ; 
.3y vil,tue of Canadian relationship ··ri th GrC'a t 1ri tain 
and the United 3tates Canada vias a natur2.l member and gpve 
• quick rA.sponse and coO}Jeration f:>om the start in :'arming the 
'7. 
rlorth ~tl ntic ~act . 0 
'l'he _,orth 1-itlantic ?~tct applies , at lcsst potentially , 
to the whole or :B;ur·ope borde:::"ing on the 1-1. tlBnti c and main 
• Eurooean ap~::.;roaches north of the Tropic of Cancer . -'-'ire did 
') 
~ualfo::ed L . LJskins , '.:'~e \.tl• ntic Pcct , ( .ashington, 
.8 . c . : rublic A:f.!.'airs ix•oss , 1949) , p . 37 . 
3Lester B. }carson, Can diun Secretary of State for 
.._:_::tern.e.l •• .f airs , 11 CPn<da "'l'ld the ')rth t.tlantic Alli8.nce , " 
',0 1"eircn A"'f'air-co -!ol -::>7 ·ro ~ n-r>·l lC•LLn ''"'O "'78 
- ..:.. .... ......L ___ u, - • ·~ , . o , .. -;.--l , v ..... ;y . pp . ,)t)o..~ - o • 
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\Wuld :>e included in the Pact 'v'i ti10ut nuch hesitation . 5 
'J.':i.1o Scr.ndinavian u-!'oun: 
Den.'YJlark , 11or vay , S'ileden and Iceland have all been 
a.!.J.~. roached to join the -act . dussia put str·ong pressure on 
e11nark , :.Jl".-!ay and .3'.7ed ··n . 'l'hese three states have strong 
democratic systems end are participants in the European 
Rccovsry rrogren . 31:7edr·n, be"LnG so close to ~iu:Jsia ~nd 
because of its neutrality in the Second iforld .ar , did not 
join the .I-act . )eing an industri~:l.l country Sv1eden desired to, 
remain indspnndently st.::ong but the armed forces of iussia 
could overl~un the country in a mc.ti~er o.r::' a fc 17 days . On to~ .. 
of e1.i.s , Sv;ccl3n is at };resent dS.J"IlQCnt upon CO!"l -'-rom Folfnd 
'.'rhich she could not risk to lose b,y joinin.Q" th~= :act . 5 
1 OF\7ay had to m2.ke a hnrd and brPve choice in joining 
the Lorth A tlnnti c Pact . It has an imoort'l.nt coruon ooundary 
rri th 1 ussia ond this has vo.luable mincr8ls . lwrnay 1 s s trategt c 
osition lies in her o·.-m8rship of the Jcctic island of 
S~itzbergen .hich would prove of considerable signi:icance in 
t . 7 an a orrn c vrar • 
L' 
vHosl~in , £12. · cit ., 1;p . 44 - 4:5 . 
" 
II vlU'!'ent D8velo~..;ments in 7 Jni ted Sta tea 'orcic.n foli cy- fl 
'rookings_I.2:stitutions , Vol . 2 , lo . 7 , February , l949 , pp . 14- lG . 
7 Ibid ., pp . 14- 16 . 
• 
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Like Lorvray , Dcn1mark -yas in a sinil2..r nosi tion but 
• de cided to join the f'qct . Its possession of GreenlEmd is 
of strategic valuo . d 
Iceland has a particular strategic posit ion being I 
between tvro great continental land Ll8.sses . It n0eded externa 
military support . In iopld .Jnr II the -united States had 
garrisoned its troops ther-e but ,-: ithdrew i:nneclio.tely at the 
end of the vrar but th::. t gave Icelanders confj_d,3nce in the 
United Statcs . 9 
Italy had some difficulty in joining the Pact . ~rPnce , 
and lrraat ~r·itain objected on the follo'.Jin;; ~our grounds : 
(1) ot cap ble of followinc consistent loreicn policy , (2) 
It vms in the ,1edi terrane an area instead of the Atlantic , 
( 3) Its l ur•ge Corrununist population iTould be dangerous , ( 4) 
.. ot a rnember of the United :Nc.. tions . 
The United States maintained that Italy could join 
the l'act under rticles 34 and 35 of tho United !.ations 
Cht.rter . rl'hesc 8.rticles a llow a non- member to brin_; its 
c ase befoT,e the Security C:)uncil . ''he United States further 
jlnaintained that Italy's joining YJoulcl stronr;then the non-
Go:rn.c"'11Unis t eloraent •10 
9 I- · c1 
___E2:_ . ' pp . 14- 16 . 
cit 
C L.A.PTEH. XIV 
L PLICA.L'IO- S 01' T:'"E, PAC'r 
In the Drevious chapter th-8 Ylriter hn s disc,ls ed so"lle 
of tne im ort.:mt stratec;ic problems conr.ected --·i th the ~ orth 
~'1-tlrntic .t'act . 
In this last chapter the "\7ri ter wil l mention brie.fly 
some .further and vital issues in relation to tho Pact . 
Sone of the follov!ing issues Yrill have no iE1.mediate 
ansr1ers and undoubtedly they "\7ill hsvc to be solved in the 
course of actual expe~ience . 
The first auestion that comes to one 1 s mind is nhether 
this act ·dll sec1ve )eace . Can SCJcu:!:'i ty be .., c~lieved only 
b.r noans of arr.w a:1.d rtili t 0 ry provisions and can it stop an 
acc·ressor? Ce.n an r ; ressor bo stop~;ed by a ·:-0-.7 armed 
divisions of the sie;natories especit=1lly rrlJ.en such a united 
army is not 6.11 stationed in ;uro~-::e ? 
'l'he other '"UC)Stion is rhethe r the er.1r,hasis on armar.Pnts 
_tJrovokes an a.cms rece thus diverting the eaphasis from 
economic recovery ~hi ch at a long :!:'2.n;:;e may \'eaken the 
si~natori")s of the ~act instead of strengthen . 1 
1 
1 
~~son aldwin , ~~ito~ial in 
Lecember 5 , 1948 . 
Sone people are of the bcli9f thqt the ?act is an 
instrument YTi1.i ch \'ould create uncertainty and a sense of 
fn.lse security \'lhi ch mir;ht _{'innlly I'c:lbound u·1on 
but not a~fect the im1orialism of Soviet lli ssiu 
0 
range plf:lns . -~ 
~h-. sir;natorils 
ln lts long 
'l'he Ect may cre,,te no confidence among the sip1.atoriAIS 
nor at tho sP,me time in the United Nations . Consequc:."l"'cl~~ , 
it may har.1.~Jer the thought of federation in '.Jest8rn Ul'Ope 
\Thi ch may be of ::nore virtue than the I~orth tl ntic !'act . 3 
The 1 orth 1 tL 1ti c .!:'act p;::ovides mea "lures __ or 
collective ~ction in case of an external a~gression but t0ere 
;are no provisions to check internal revolution should the 
I
Comnunists of ranee and Italy come into D01'er nc::. 
goverrm~ont even ··ithout the help of SoviPt HUssia . 
form a 
'l.'he &rms 
1 tnen su.._:Jplied to these nations by the · orth Atl-ntic Pact 
could ironic~.ll'T c used '-'·c.inst other sign!:ltOl."'ics . 1'he 
ar:rm and c pi t.;mont tlD.."'ough a period of from four to five 
years oulc. cost the United St2tes a '~-:lout 15 to 18 b:llion 
2 ditorial in the I.ovr iork Times , J'-'rch :1 , l 49 . 
3
...;;di to ial in the l.cw York ~'ir:~:;s , Uarch 28 , 19-19 
I dollr rs . 'l'his r'1e~ns ·urther taxation on top of the present 
natlona.l debt Fnd. a setbact: in the stc.nd'lrd of living by not 
h&ving ade u .te housin: , education and many ot:1.er corm.ected 
problems . lould ri'lcricans become i '"~tient f'or not having 
thin s 1 ol' -shc:.s..::lves insto"'d of - av:..ng t'!.eir r.:.oncy ::md 
natur&l r~sources drain out in for6igr countries? This may 
irritate ~heM ~nd they may then st~rt li~teni~~ to Co1~unist 
ro )0 l 1-anc.'l , -
o 1 ·iill the orth Atl!'tntic .tact affect t c positions 
0 the Si ,natories rnd their possessions in sia Hl!.d .. 'rica? 
.auld th~ United States also underwrite assi0tance to Great 
_)ri ta1n in isia \Ji th her 9:,oblems in Lalaya? 1Jould the United 
tates also secure p"la ce in the .r<'rench f:JOSGession of Indo - I 
5 Chin9.. and in Indones i a nhich is under the l'.eth rlands? 
In fri ca , ;~ren ch Algeria is al:eead:;r incl ded in the 
act but --,.hat about '.i'unls '"'nd i orocco and the act ' s 
relationship · ri th the .L,i tish treaty in Er:ypt? • O' ·1ould 
1'. 
-·~nson "'.ld,·rin , 
:1 , ,./ , l'iH9 . 
~ditorial in the -ork 'l'ime s , 
r::: 
,)Vera i icl,sl9s , 11 :. os ' .. nc Cons o:: the , Ol"th ~.tl nti c 
.:...1 c fens e act , 11 , ) r c i --:;n .:' o 1 i c y R ... ports , Tl o 1 • ~ 11. , o • 1 9 , 
eo:·wn,_y- lb , 1 "9 , -, , 232 . 
==============-----
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it f.1 ffe ct the _elc;ian e Cf'orts to cont1·ol tho 'Jongo or the 
-ortusuesc rule in ~1-::.tgola and . oza.:nbique? These ['_::_ ... c nur1.0rous 
.._..'urOfGan .. -roblcms and -'-or the i'irst time th0 "'Jnited States 
uill face the runerican people uith foreign concerns . 
The Pact ~nd th0 United lations : 
<ould the ract strent;then or Vleaken the United 
. 6 
1 ations? Do,:\s it mean the aclmission on the part of tho 
si~natories of the failure of tho (~ited .ations by not 
having it made to '·ork and by finding merely an e:-:cuse by 
I sa--in'"" the Pact is ·i thin the :'rame"ror t of the Uni t0d :Ja t ions ? Y- 0 
, :oulC t.cley , in the future , act and r0port to the 3oc-_,-rity 
.Jouncil? 
•rnis collectivc security of the North AtL-·ntic ~- ct 
may be an example for other such '"lliances thus creating 
pouer politics -,•hich would destroy rathcr thRn build global 
cooperati on . 
'l·he .ract may only provide 2n illusion of security 
by h&vine; an arms race bet\7een Soviet _'uss ia and the .. festern 
democi'acies thus i ncr·:;as ing friction and reducing the chances 
of peace in the 7orld . 
6
....;di torial in the l ev1 iork Tines , Janu"-ry 30 , 1949 .• 
'-=--=-=--~====--- - -
'.!.' 1er>e is a big question of the cost of the :~orth 
act . Undoubtedly the United States ':ill have to 
an arsenal :t'or suppl~y-ing arms to the sic-,nator~ies . 
of the .l:'f: ct is figured betHeon ·,10 billion and '18 
7 billion dollars . I'he qu3stion is , ·:auld the tax .!.)ayers be 
vrillin.; to ":_Jay as long as the L orth A tlunti c J: c· ct exists 'lnd 
y:;i th it the r arshall Plan, aid to Greece ~md Turkey 2.nd lately, 
oint ... ·'our )esides other emer_:;eney ftmds i'or :.':'opeisn countires '? 
'l'hese costs aPe outside American defense plans . 'ioulc. it 
not be Y!ise to build an entir•e and solid Amer·ican defense 
instecd of buildinc up foreign countries? Io·-rever , if the 
United States does not hPlp the signatories they mi~ht vell 
fall the victim of Soviet Rnssia . ~{earn8..Y1Ant of free n· tions 
therefore raay add to several other int.ernG t..ional eon"!'li t t·-:1~nts 
alr'eady assumed by the United States . Thus , t'1ere \.rill be 
1'urther .t'inancial drain on the United ..:;.tate s and its peop l e . 
The ns~er to the Problens : 
The above problems and others yet to come have no 
satj_sl'actory ansv.rer in the entire sense . Uany questions c annot 
be ansvmrecl vii thout actual exoerience but no o:•e ean at the 
s~ .. ne time say that the Pact is ideal in every sense anc furthett' 
that it ···ill not croa te nqny serious problens and severe 
'7 ,ow Lork 1'imcs , Lar-:;h 27 , 1949 . 
=====l::===:cc_=:_-= 
' 
" •..) . 
Ho\·ever , under the _~rcs'""'nt -.. orld c~rcunstances 
it vras t~"1.o I 
. t . .;... t• 8 lD3 l ,u J.ons . 
8 
r . rhilip 0 . Jessup , re·v [ork Tir.~s , 1 "rch 21, 194 ,. 
--~ ~ 
I 
CO CLUSIOK 
It follo'73 thct in order to pos>oss an~" vi"'tue at 
all e_n alliance must have sorre t t . l"t" f ~, . I po sn lR l los o an ol~enslVi 
cl:c- ractcr . './hat is not to say that it ~'ill nec.:;sn,.., rily 
possess aggressive traits . There are not mGny constants 
in our y~escnt world . Allianc0s 2ro formed for a great 
variet-;,- of re~.sons and under l"iidely v'"'rying circU!"TI.'Jt .nces . 
0one h~ve been of b~icf duration, others hqve extended over 
nan"· ·oars . Some ho.v0 set forth the pur-:;osos of the 
signatories :ra~'ly End stncerely ; others ~~ve conce~led , 
bet1 ·een th0 lines of published trJxt or in soc::.'ot e.rti clos , 
thoir real intent . Sonq hav0 ~qen a~cnciqs of pe~ce; oth~r~ , 
not nl· a:·s i 'l.tentionall-- , h:"ve led to I'Pm'"ld conflict . 
.. :1at the ~ orth AtlRntic act v;ill lead to is '::F:.rd to 
tell at this sta·e . owev"lr , one tbing is cert~ ln , th~.t 
the a~~ressor eventually ~ill have no o.dv&nta ~s over the 
_.orth .!' -clantic c..ct si_c:;natories becc.use they ··ill have a 
co:nbin"d m2.npowor , naterial, ancl strato[ ic ')Osition much J 
I 
e;rea ter than any of tl1e ag<· ressor . The a;gressoi' may--E.a·:re-
some B.dvantc, '>es in attacking the signatories in the L~i . ., - -· ..l 
stages but in the long run the ag··rp-ssor ;:rill be ca~;ed . 
/I 
II 
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is possible thEJ.t in the next ·:ar merica will see 17ar in 
its land unlike other >mrs . 1Iouever , by having the 
str2..tegic bases of our i'riends vre may be able to l:eep the 
\'Jar off .tl.Inerican shores ancl for this price rl..l.'tlerica should 
not hesi t8.te in arming our fr•iends end in helping them in 
every Yray possible . If we c an make them strong enout:_~n 
Russia may not dare to provoke a thir•d world war Dnd if it 
does she will reo.p the consequences . 
~ennral OmD.r _.r:=tdley has said that it must be 
?erfectly apparent to the peopl8 of the United States 
the:. t ''e cannot count on friends in · !es to::•n •:Urope if our 
stratecy in the event of W'3-T' dict'-'.tes th"'t l"le sh[ ll first 
abt.ndon ther;1 to the enemy ui th a promi sG of la tei' 
liberr~tion . It is a strategy that -~;ould produce nothing 
better than irtuotent and disillusioned Allies . I 
.fremior of ~·ranee 'clUeille has further stated that the 
-·'rench ~Jeople think thr:tt the United States would liberate 
them i f they were invaded but that this time HI am afraid 
nothing would be l eft to liberate exc~pt the corpse of 
.., . I 
...!.U.rope . 
Our basic aim is peace , not ,-... ap , but :h.st 
unpreparedness will bring to us is quite clear by the above 
statements . 'l'he .~.or th Atlantic Pa:t is v;holly dnfensive . 
r1'herc are no r. ... u;ressive desic;ns of any sort openly st-::.ted , 
cove1,tly concealed or in anJ vJr-:_y connected 'lli th this Tr ..-a ty 
APPENDIX A 
C.ffrWNOLOG.i OF EVENTS R"SLATING TO THE PACT1 
1945 
2ebruary ll : The Yalta Protocol and AQreement are concluded . 
March 6: rhe Am9rican republics approve the Act Jf 
Chaoultepec at the Inter- AmPrican Conference on 
Problems of vJar and Feace at J exico City . In the Act 
the governments declare 11 thnt every attack of a state 
against the soverei~nty or political independence of a 
American state , shall ... be considered as an act of 
a~~ressi on against the other states which si~n this 
Act .•. 11 
April 25: .t<'ifty nations meet for the United Nations 
Conference on International Or~anization at San 
.r'rancisco , Californi a . 
June 26 : 'l'he Charter of the United Nations is signed by fiftY! 
countries which participated in the San Francisco 
Conference . 
July 28: The United States Senate , by a vote of 89- 2 , consents 
to the ratification o.f the Chnrter of the United Nations 
and the Statute of the Internqtional Court of Justice . 
Au gust 1: 'l'he l"otRdam AfTreement is concluded . 
October 24 : The Chqrter of the Uni.ted Nations enters into 
el'fect as t 1venty- ninth nation denosi ts instrument of 
ratification with the United States . 
December 24 : Secretary of State Byrnes propos8s a four - Dower 
agreement among the United Stqtes , Great Britain, 
France and the Soviet Union for the puroose of keeoing 11 
Germany disarmed . 
1Halford L. hoskins , The Atlantic Pact , ( ~ashington , 
D. C., ~ublic ffairs Press , 1949 ), pp . 69- 76 . 
.30 . 
1946 
March 5: iin~ton Churchill recommends in a speech at Fulton, 
Mo ., that the United St'1tes and Great Britain form a 
military alliance for mutual defense . 
March 18 : Iran files an official charge with U. P . egain~t 
the U. S . S . R . 
May 6 : ¥resident Truman proposes that the United States arm 
the Americas for defense . 
hay 17: The United States oro~oses joint defense plans with 
I Canada , particularly for the Arctic frontier . 
August 21 : The United States rejects the Soviet proposal tha 
U. S . S . R . shRre control of Dardanelles with Turkey . 
August 27: Seven United States warships are ordered to uay 
a 11 courtesy 11 trip to Gree ce. 
1947 
March 4: The Dunkirk Treaty , allying Great Britain and 
Fr~nce , is si~ned . 
March 12: The 11 Truman Doctrine 11 is outlined in the .t'resident *s 
1:essage to Co''fYress urging United StR.tes su~port of 
11 free peoples who Hre resisting attempted subjugation" 
and an_,_Jrooria tion of •p400 million in direct aid to 
Greece and rrurkey . 
March 17: 1'he brussels Treatv , basis of ·~estern Union, is 
signed . 
May 15: Conpress gives final aJ_:)roval to the Greek- 1I'urkish 
·aid bill to implement the "Truman Doctrine" . 
June 5: Secretary of State Marshall makes a speech at Harvar~ 
advocating agreement on over- all needs as basis for 
United States economic aid to European n~tions . 
I 
June 17: Foreign ~inisters Bevin of Great Britain and Bidaul 
of France initiate conversations in P8ris on Secretary 
Harshall ' s oroposal . 
July 12: Representatives of 16 nRtions ~~ich 2ccepted the 
invitation of filoreign Pini~ters Bevin 8.nd Bidault meet 
~n . 
in Paris . 
Sevtember 2: 'l'he Inter- Al"'lerican 11'reat:v of' RPcinrocal 
A"lsistance , Jrnown as the Rio Pact , is si...,.ned by the 
mericen J9~ublics (19) renres8nted at the Rio 
Conference . 
Octooer 6: The Cominform, new VPrsion of the ConintArn, 
or anized at !Brsaw, i~ comoo~ed of reur sentativas of 
the U. s . S . R., Yu~oslaviA , ?r1nce , ItPlv, PolRnd , 
.01 1 a..,...ia , CzechoslovakiR, ,1unf"'T'V <>nd rlumnnia . I 
October 22: GenerRl :ldhanov, speakin'"; for the Cominf)rm, nsk~~ 
th1-•t Co ununists ever> T\ h( re or.,o ~r-> thP lVt'1r>9hPll .t-lan as 
the instrument of American imperalism. 
Octooer 24 : ~enelux countries exchange r"'tifications on thein 
cust'J1'11.<:: llnion agreement . 
1948 
January 22: F'oreign ]ninister Bevin in thP House of Comrrons 
pro~oses the unific~tion of ~stern Europe . 
Fe bPURry 23 : The Cornrnuni t na-rty in Cze chosloval ia gains 
control of the gove-rnment throUJ'?h a conp d 1 etfl t. 
N"rch 17: The Conference of rAnrasentatives of Gr~et dnit2in,
1
1 
.b'rance , delP-;ilun, the Netherlands and Lu emhourg on 
.~estern lJnion ends with the sio-nature of a 50 - year I 
treaty of collective military aid and economic and 
social coooer8tion. 
March 17: In an R.dr1_ress to Cono-ress t'resident Truman states: 
"I am sure that the determinl'ltion of the free countrie 
of Burope to prote ct themselves will be matched by an 
eq_u2l dete:r:--mination on our part to help them do so ." 
April 2 ! Congress passes the ~oreign Assistance Act of' 1948. 
April 30 : Defense I•inisters and Chtefs of St,qff of _'ranee , 
Great britain and the Benelux nations meet in London 
and initiate joint military discussions . 
May 19: The report issued by the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee on the "Vondenberg Resolution" states that 
11 the Comrr'i ttee is convinced th·=tt until the United 
Nations has been strengthened su~ficiently to assure 
( ::> 
J • 
June 
July 
universal security, the best means of reinforcing the 
security of individu"ll members lies in prorressive 
develoo~ent of such re ·ional ~nd other ~ollective 
defense arrang,ements . 11 
11: The United St8Tes Senate passes Senqte R0solution 
239 , tne so- called 11 Vandenherp.; Resolution" v:hi ch 'Jro -
noses "associ._tion of the United States , by 
constitutional process , 'IIith such re rional and other 
collective arr~n~ements ?S are based on continuous and 
ef·'ective self-help nnd mutual !lid , -''md RS affect its 
national security . " 
6 : Ambassadors to the United States fron Can~da , Great 
Uri tain, France and the c3enelux countries meet v-Ii th 
Under- Secretary of Stq t e Lovett for .o.n e}:chRnete of vi e,Jvi~ 
on Euronean defense reauirements . 
1
July 20 : It is stRted in London that United States and 
Canadian military experts vi ll join as "non-members" iq 
the consultations of the Permanent Yi litary Conmittee of 
the arussels powers . 
II 
September 27 : J:"orei gn Secretary Bevin in a speech before the 
U, N. Security Council st-"ltes : "If we c ,•nnot proceed 
on a world basis •.• we must nroceed on a re'1:ional 
basis ..•• " 
Se::>tember 27 , 28 : The DPfense I·inisters of 1!estern Union in 
conference at Paris announce apreement on common 
defense policy and formation of an organization to 
carry out that uolicy . 
'
October 4: A military st"'ff is anoointed by Brussels Treaty 
powers . 
October 26 : The Consultative Council of the \vestern Union 
holds its third meeting in Faris ~nd agrees to seek a 
J orth Atlantic security pact . 
Octooer 28 : The Canadian Minister of External Affairs , 
Lester B • .t'esrson, announces that Canada has informed 
members of the ,/estern Euronean Union that Canada is 
prepared to enter into ne~otiations for a re~ional 
treaty of collective se curity . 
November 11: Senator Vandenberg ~remises a~ain th8t the 
United St2tes will 11 aid other friendly , independent 
nations to stand on their o>vn feet i n defense of their 
II 
own freedom . " 
November 19 : rremier Salazar of Portugal in an interview 
declares : "The salvation of Portugal , ifestern Rurope 
and the Occidental !Jorld lies in the formation of a 
true Atlantic bloc . " 
November 27 : The British F'oreign Office announces completion I 
of the d~aft of a North Atlantic Defense Pact by I 
delegates of the five \Jestern Powers . 
December 2 : U. S . S . R . press warns Scandinavian count~'ies I 
against nlans for a Scandinavian military bloc . 
Dec~mber 1: Secretary of Defense Forrestal declares that 
military equiDment must be given generously to Western 
Europe to give meaning to the Brussels Treaty . 
Decemoer 10 : Negotiatlons for the North ~tl~ntic ~act open 
between cting Secretary of State Lovett , the ~-inister 
of Luxembourg , and the Ambassadors of CHnPda , Great 
Britain, France , Belgium and the Netherlands . 
1949 
January 10 : President rrruman , in his Budget lVless~ge, indicat~s 
that the principal measure of economic and military ai~ 
will go to the nations shar i ng U. s . international 
objectives . I 
January 14 : A policy statement issued by the StBte Denartmenu 
cites Soviet OPPosition to majority policies in the 
U. N., Communist obstructio n to the Marshall Plan, the 
Communist coup i n Czecho s lovaki a , and the Russian 
blockade of Berlin as leadin~ to the Atlrntic Pact . 
January 20 : In his Inau gural Address President Truman 
recommends that the United Stntes associHte itself by 
treaty in a !!collective defense arr11.ngement 11 with free 
EuroPean countries . 
II 
II 
January 25 : Formation of a Council for Economic :Mutual 
Assistance among the U. S . S . R ., Bulgaria , Czechoslovaki~ , 
Hungary , Rumania , and Poland . 
January 28 : The ~ifestern Union Dowers announce the creation o 
a Counci l of Europe composed of f) Council of l'inisters , 
an executive body~ and a Legislative Assembly , reurese~t­
owers . 
January 29: The Soviet Union issues in Moscow a ·.ni te ""'r:tper 
asserting that the North Atlantic Pact is intended to 
establish United States and Brit ish domination of the 
1lfOrld by force. 
January 29: The U. S.S . R . asks the Norwe gian Gov8rrrment to 
clarify its stand on the Atlantic Pact . 
January 29: The Sv1edish i'oreisn Linister submits to the 
Scandinavian ministers meeting at Oslo a drqft for a 
three- nation defense treaty outside of the proposed 
North Atlantic defense pact . 
January 30: Flans for a defensive alliance bet ~reen Norway , 
Sweden and Denmark, vrhi ch had been under discus ion for 
severQl months, are shelved . 
!February l: In answer to the U. S.S . R. 1 s renuest of Janu8ry 29, 
the Norse Government states that it will not enter into 
any F'l !:trer->ment nJi th other co11ntries obli ··a ting rorway to 
gr"nt bases on T\forwee;ian terri tory unless Norwav is 
attacked or threatened with attack . 
I 
February 6: The Soviet Union offers Norwa>r a non-a.gc;r~"ssion 
)act and warns tacitly against joining ,., North Atlanti c 
defense ~-=tct . 
.t•'ebru8.ry ll: SecY'et"'ry General of the United lT-=tti.ons Tr<rgve 
Lie warns again t re-ional ·0acts unless they recognize 
the supremacy of the United N tions • 
.i:'1 ebruary 17: The Turkish Foreign IHnister proJoses to the 
ForPi~n ~inister an extensi.on of the North Atl·ntic 
by a suonlementary agreement for the defense of the 
Mediterranean area . 
.r<repch 
f'a It 
February 18: Secretary of State Ache 
}'or<>i"'n tiPl"'tions r.nrwitt0P to 
Atlantic Pact. 
II 
on meets \ith the ~enate 
niscuss the North 
February 20: Senator Robert 1 . Ta t endorses a qtrong North 
Atlantic CJecurity 'J"Ct thnt would nled9'e United States 
"id to /estr:>rn Europe in cRse of attack . 
February 21 : Gr8el< 1-<'orei[l'n Hinister Ts<>ldaris t"tes that 
destern r<~urot'e.qn stt'tesmen understand the dPsiY'e of 
Greece nnd Turk8y for a l11edi terrt>.nean defense alliance 
to supplement the Atlantic Pact. 
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ebru~ry 22: Maurice Thorez, Spcr8t<1ry Gener"'l of the .French 
Communi. t PB.rty , stA.tes that French Communists '"lould 
not fight the Soviet Union in the evAnt of a war bet 'lee 
that country and .J:t'rance . 
feoruary 23: The Minister for ExternRl Affairs of Eire inform~ 
the D8il th::J t he had explain8d to the United St"' tes 
Eire 's agreement •vith the general aim of the North 
Atlantic ~act but that Eire could not undertake any 
milit~ry alliance with the state ( Great Britain) 
responsible for partition. 
'ebruary 26: Italian Communist leader 'I'ogliatti states that 
I in case of conflict between the Soviet Union and Italy I it would be the duty of Italians to aid the Soviet Army 
I 
~liarch 3 : .~:wrway recuests and receives an invitation to join 
~VIarch 
I 
:March 
conversations on the North Atlantic security nact . 
4: 'fhe Norwe;"ian Ambassador to the United States joins 
the Ambassadors ' Committee in Vashington negotiating 
the North Atlantic Pact . 
7: A dra f't of the proposed North A tle.nti c treaty is 
comuleted by the Ambassadors ' Committee meeting in 
Washington Rnd is sent to Canada and the vestern 
European countries for official approval. 
1'-'rch 8 : 'l'he Italian Cabinet backs Italy 1 s participation in 
the North Atlanti c Pact . 
~arch 10: The Danish Forei~n ~inister arrives in 'Vashington to 
discuss the North Atlanti c Pact . 
1March 10 : 'l'he .Dritish Cabinet approves the final draft of the ! 
I Atlantic Pact . 
10: The Soviet ~inance kinister discloses that the 
Soviet Government plans to spend the equivalent of <1,15 
billion on its armed forces during the coming year , an 
increase of 20% over last year . 
March 11: Premier de Gasperi of Italy announces in a session 
of the Chamber of Deputies that his government has 
approved Italy ' s participation in the North Atlanti c 
Alliance. 
1March 12: The Danish Foreign Minister states thRt he had 
11 satisfactory" talks vri th United Stetes Department of 
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State officials regarding Greenland ' s role in the 
Atlantic Pact . 
March 13: Iceland ' s Foreign rJinister arrives in ;[ashington I 
for talks on Atl"ntic Pact , stflting th8t Iceland would 
refuse to grant neace - time bases to any forei~n power . 
M8rch 14: The Foreign Ministers of the five Brussels Treaty 
nowers begin a 2 - day conference to coordinPte ·estern 
Eurooean defense organization nith the North Atlantic 
Pact . 
March 14: Australia ' s Defense Mini ter states that he hopes 
for a Pacific defense pact similar to the North Atlontic 
Treaty . 
March 15: The Foreign Ministers of the five Brussels Treaty 
powers ap~rove the terms of entry into the North 
Atlantic Pact at a conference in London . 
March 15: Iranian officials voice fears that the Soviet Uniort 
plans to invoke the 1921 treaty whereby its troops might 
enter Iran on the pretext th~t the security of the 
Soviet Union is threatened . 
March 16: The Portuguese Embassy in Washington issues a 1 
statement giving support to the principles of the Nortlii 
AtlR.ntic Pact . 
March 16 : The French Cabinet an.proves the AtlRntic Pqct, at 
the sBme time exnressing desire for further cll'lrii'ication 
of details of the armament r-rogram and P'lili tary 
orrsaniza tion . 
March 17: InvitB.tions Pre issued to ItB.ly, l'ortugal , Denmark 
and Iceland to join the Atlentic Alliance. 
March 18: The total cost of the Marshall Plan for the four 
and a c~uarter vear prorram is estimated as 817,000,000 1000 
by Yaul C. Ho ~fman, Economic Cooperation Administrator 
arch 18: The text of the North Atl~ntic Treaty is made 
uublic v•i th indications that the Pact will be signed 
during the first vreek in April . 
March 18: Foreign Secretary Bevin champions the Atl ~ ntic 
Pact before the House of Commons and, later , in a 
broadcast, declares the treaty to be a strong defense 
ar-ainst Communist encroachment and a gre' t step toward 
~7 . 
world ueace ond security . 
19 : The Italian Chamber of Denuties votes , 342 to 170 , 
in favor of Italy ' s adherence t o the North Atlantic 
Pact . 
19 : A \fuite fan er on " The North Atlqntic Pect" is 
by the De ) .rtment of St.ote . 
20: The ~oscow r a dio denounces the North Atlantic Tre a 
qnd cha rnes that a .fa cific pact is being pr0 ~ 8red as 
another link in the Dlan for "Anglo - Americ!>n world 
domination . 11 ·-
Ma rch 21: The Russian news-o aper Pravda of Leningra d a ccuses 
Finl'lnd of violatin~ its neA.ce treat;r ,"i th the Soviet 
Union and W"'rns a gainst Fin.Dish alh;nment 1n:i th the 
· Jeste-rn powers . 
l>iEJrch 23 : Se cretary of State Acheson supoorts the Irani an 
Government ' s denial to the Soviet Union that Iran is 
being converted into an lu'1eri can military base for 
operPtions against the U. s . s . R . 
March 23 : A nle n to include FrE>nce and ''estern GPr:many in the 
13ene l ux customs arrR_n~ement is reported to be under jJ 
consideration . 
March 26 : France t> nd Italy sign an economic "l'""rePmPnt ry rovidi,ng 
for the esta blishment of a customs union between the 
two countries within one year ' s time and an economic 
union in six years . 
March 31 : The U. S . S . R . delivers its official protest against 
.. 
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the North Atlcntic Treaty to the seven sponsoring nPtiqns . 
April II 4 : The North Atl Pntic Tre a ~y is signed by representatives 
of Gre8 t Brita in, France , Belgium , the Ne therl ands , 
Luxembourg, Portu,.al, Denmark , Norway , Ita ly , Iceland , 
Canada , and the United StatAs in WAshington , D . C. 
Aoril 13 : Soviet spokesman Adnrei Gromvko , sp ~aking in the 
U. N. Asse nbly , attacks the North ~tl antic Pact as an 
a ggressive blo c designed to p rovoke war . 
April 27 : Senate Foreign Relations ComMittee opens hearings 
on the North Atl ~ nti c Treatv . 
29 : Ca nada becomes first sipn'ltory nation to ratify the 
h'lay 5: 
Atlantic Pa~t as House of CoMmons gives unanimous 
aporoval . 
Representatives of GrePt Britain, Frqnce , RAlgium, 
the Netherlands , Luxembourg , Italy , Icel"'nd , Nor-·~ay, 
Denmqrk 1:1nd Sweden, meeting in London sign the Statute 
of the Council of Europe crerting a Euron ean Pa rli ament . 
May 11: Dr . V . K . ,/elling ton Koo , Ambassador of the r.hinese 11 
Nationalist Government in .-:ashing ton, p ron oses an 
Asiatic alliance simi l ar to the North Atl~ntic re g ional 
defense arrangement . 11 
May 12 : Belgium completes ratification of the Atlantic Pqct 
a s Senate votes ap oroval , 127 to 13 . The Chamber of 
Deputies previously endorsed the treaty. If 
May 12 : The British House of Common ratifies the North 
Atlantic Pac t by a vote of 336 to 6 . 
,, 
Hay 14 : The Department of State outlines the forthcoming 
request for "pl , 450 , 000,000 military aid p rogram desig n d 
to assist members of the Atlsntic Pact and other fr e e 
nations in rebuilding toeir defense systems . 
May 18: Secretary of Sta te Acheson expresses opp osition to 
the formation of a Pacific pact prior to the settlemA n 
of internal disturbances in Asiatic countries . 
June 7: The ren ort of the Sen~te F oreign Rel ~ tions Committee 
unanimously endorses the North Atlantic Trea ty a nd 
asks ratific8 tion as a means of incre asing t h e n rospect 
of avoiding a third world wa r . 
June : ~v'l.s neuvers of the comb ined fleets of the '.:estern 
European Union countries held this month demonstr !=l te 
the tyoe of collaboration p rovided for under the 
Atlantic fact . 
July 21 : The United States Sennte ratifies the North 
Atl&ntic Pact by a vote of 82 to 13 . 
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APPENDIX B 
EXC ,;RPTS FRO!'" THE ARTICLES OF 'l'lfE UiiJI'I'ED NATIONS1 
ARTICLE 34 
The Security Council may investigate any disuute , 
jor any situation which might lead to international friction 
or give rise to a dispute , in order to determine 'Jhether the 
continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger 
the maintenance of international peace and security . 
RTICLE 35 
1 . Any Uember of the United l'Jations may bring any 
disuute, or any situation which might lead to international 
friction or give rise to a disnute , in order to determine 
whether the continuance of the disuute or situation is likely 
to endan.-,·er the maintenance of international peace and 
'3ecurity • 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
ARTICLE 51 
Nothing in the uresent Charter shall imnair the 
inherent right of individual or collective self- defense if 
jl __ _
1Lel8.nd M. Goodri ch Edvard H ambro , Ch2.rter of the 
II 
__:;:___;;_,~-7-::.--=---t..:......::.:_:: ___ ,.;__ -""~;::;-;::--:;-:-.;;_D-'o--'c"-uments , (Boston: World Peace 
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armed attack occurs against a Hember of the United Nations , 
taken thP measures necessar-.r to 
international ueace and security . Measures tnken by 
exercise of this ri~ht of self - defense shall 
be immediately reported to the Security Council and sh~ll not 
lin any way effect the authority and responsibility of the 
:security Council under the :;)resent Charter to take at any time 
1such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or 
:restore international peace and security . 
CHAPTER VIII 
RBGIOHAL ARRANGBMENTS 
Article 52 
1 . Nothing in the nresent Charter precludes the 
existence of re,c;'ional arrangements or agencies for dealing 
with such matters relating to the maintPnance of intern~tiona 
pe2ce ar:d security as are approuriate for reP'ional action, 
provided th~t such arrangements or agencies and their 
activities are consistent ith the Purposes and Principles 
of the United Nations . 
I' 
2 . 'l'he Members of the United Nations entering i D. to 
such arran~ement o rn"1 tituting such agen0ics shall make 
every effort to achieve p!lcific settleMent of local disputes 
through such rerrional arrangements or by such recional 
' 
lCl , 
'I 
ncies before referring them to the Security Council. 
3 . The Security Co~Incil shell encourage the 
evelomr.ent of pacif'i c settlement of local disryutes th ·ough 
uch regional arrangements or by such re~ional agencies eithPr 
n the initiative of the states concerned or by reference 
from the Security Council. 
4. This Article in no way i~pairs the p p lication 
of Articles 34 end 35. 
AR'l'ICLE 53 
1. The Security Council shPll, where appropriate, 
~tilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement 
1action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall 
e taken under re~ional arran~ements or by re~ional a~encies 
rithout the authorization of the Security Council , with the 
Fxception of measures against any enemy state , as defined in 
~aragraph 2 of this Article , provided .for pursuant to Article 
107 or in regional arrangements directed R ~ainst renewal o.f 
aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such 
time as ~he Orranization may, on reauest of the Govern~ents 
!concerned, be charp;ed vri th the resnonsibili ty for '; reventing 
kurther aggression by such a state . 
11 2. The term enemy state as used in Paragraph 1 of this 
rticle a!)Dlies to any state which during the Second iorld liar 
s been an enemy o.f any signatory of the p resent Charter. 
102 . 
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ARTICLE 54 
Tl1e Security Counc i l shall at al l times be kep t 
fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation 
regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the 
tenance of i nternational peace and security • 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
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APPEliDIX C 
BRUSS4'LS 'rREATYl 
Treaty of Economic, Social <nd Cultural Collaboration 
and Collective Self-D~~ence Bo t een His Majesty in ResryP.ct of 
the United Kinrrdom of Great Dritqin nd No thern Irel nd , His 
oyal Hi.c·hness the rince B.e ent of Be l("iUlrl, the Pr sident of 
the .~-'rench Republic , Her Royal Hi hness the Gr-nd Duchess of 
Luxembourg and Her 1.~-.jesty the !ciUeen of the Netherlands. 
Brussels , 17th :M~arch , 1948 
His Royal Hi p;:hness the t'rince Regent of Be l gium, the 
~rn ident of the French Republic , t'resident nf the ~rench 
Union , tier Royal Hi~hness the Gr~nd Duchess of Luxembourr , 
Her ajest~ the ueen of the Netherland and Ris l~jesty The 
Kinv of Great ~ritain , Ivel~nd and the British ~ominions 
be"'ond the Seas , 
Resolved 
'l'o re~ ffirm their faith in fundamental human rir·hts , 
in the digni tv and ·rorth o'!..' the human person "nd in the other 
ideals reclaimed in the Chrrter of the united N tions; 
l'o fortify nd preserve the rinciplPs of dei:"ocrac, , 
1,..... 'I 
o1r • Eri c Beckett , 'I'he No, ... th Atlantic_ Tr~.__ty "Phe 
the Ch·trter of the t ni ted Ta tion , 
& sons Lir1ited.~ 19-50)~--:-T). 59 - 64 . 
lOt~, • 
.I 
j 
jl 
ersonal freedom and political liberty, the constitutional 
tr~ditions and the rule of lsw , which are their coTl"mon 
hr:>ri ta~·e ; 
To strengthen, with these Rims in view , the economic, 
social and cultural ties by v1hich they Bre 1=1lr~"8.dy united; 
To co - o erqte lovRllv and to co-ordtn.te their efforts 
to creq.te in v,festern Eurooe a firm basis for European economi 
Jrecoverv ; I 
To afford assistance to ~?ach other , in accord.qnce ,.,ith 1 
I 
the Charter of the United :ti'a tions , in T'1aintair1.ing 
international neace and security and in resisting any policy 
of sgq:ression; 
To take such steos as may be held to be necessary in 
the event of a renewal by Germany of a policy of a~gression ; 
ro associate urogressively in the ~ursuance of these 
aims other bt tes inspired by the same ideals and animated by 
the like determination; 
Desiring for these uurnoses to conclude a treaty for I 
collaboration in economic , soci8.l and cultural matters ~nd fo 
collective self- defence ; 
Have an~ointed es their :leninotentiaries : 
.................................. .. ................ .. .. .... .. 
who , having exhibited their full nowers found in p::ood and duel 
form , 
have agreed es follows : 
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ARTICLE I 
Convinced of the close co~~unity of their interests 
fnd of the necessity of uniting in order to uromote the 
fconomic recovery of Europe , the High Contracting Parties 7ill 
~o organize and co - ordinate their economic qctivities as to 
lrroduce the best possible results , by the elimination of 
conflict in their economic uolicies , the co - ordination of 
reduction and the develonment of connnercial e.,..chan:;;-es . 
The co - operation urovided for in the nreceding 
oara r ph , which 7ill be effected through the Consultative 
Council referred to in Article VII as well as throu~h other 
bodies , shall not involve any duulic8tion of, or prejudice to, 
the work of other economic or0'·'9.nizations in which the T-:Iigh 
Contracting Parties are or may be reuresented but shall on the 
contrary assist the work of thoAe organizations . 
ARTICLE II 
The High Contracting Parties will make every effort in 
common, both by direct consultation and in specialized 
jagencie8, to oromote the attainment of a higher standard of 
living by their peoules f:ln'l to develor> on correspo11.ding lines 
'l'he High Contracting Parties Vlill con nul t \"lith the 
object of achieving the earliest :_-1ossible , application of 
10 • 
re COv1r1enda tiOnS Of im.rnedia te practj_ cal intereSt, rAla ting to 
social ne.tters , adouted with their c..n· roval in the 
spe cialized ap,encies . 
'l'hey rill ende"lvour to conclude as soon as uossi ')le 
conventions vith each other in tho sryhere of social 
security . 
AR'1'I CLE III 
'l'he High Contracting .l:'arties will make every effort 
in colTli"on to lead their peoples towards a better under-
standin of the urinciples which form the basis of their 
common civilization ~nd to oro~ote cultural exchanges by 
conventions between themselves or by other means . 
ARTICLE IV 
If any of the Hi'""h Contracting l:'arties should be the 
object of an armed attack in Europe , the other Hi h 
Contr ctin~ Parties will , in accordance with the rovisions 
of Article 51 of the Chr1 rter of the United rJa tions , afford 
the Party so attacked all the military and other qid and 
assistance in their power . 
ARTICL~' V 
A..ll measures taken as a result of the preceding 
Article shall be immediately reuorted to the Security 
Co unci 1. 'l'hey shall be terminated as soon as the Security 
Council has taYen the measures necessary to maintain or 
!restore international oeace and security . 
~he nresent Treaty does not }J rejudice in any 'laY the 
obligations of the High Contracting Parties under the 
!provisions of the Charter of the United Nations . It shall no~ 
be internreted as affecting in f'.ny way the authority and 
responsibility of the Security Council under the Charter to 
take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order 
to maintain or restore international peace and security . 
AR'l' ICLE VI 
The High Contracting Parties de clare , each so far as 
he is concerned , that none of the international engagements 
now in force betneen him and any other of the High Contrsctin 
11 tarties or any third State is in conflict with the urovisions 
of the present Treaty . II 
rlone of the High Contrn cting Parties will conclude any 
alliance or participate in any coalition directed nrainst 
any other of the High Contracting Parties . 
ARTICLE VII 
For the purpose of consulting together on all the 
questions dealt with in the present Treaty , the High 
Contracting Parties v;ill create a Consultative Council, which 
ll 
' < 
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shall be so organized as to be able to exercise its functions 
continuously. The Co1mcil shall meet at such times as it 
shall deem fit. 
t the reouest of any of the Hi~h Contracting Parties , 
'
the Council shAll be immediately convened in order to nermit 
the Hicrh Contracting Parties to consult "Ji th re'"'"ard to A_ny 
situation which may constitute a threat to T)ea ce, in ·.rhr-1tever 
I 
ar~s this threat should arise; with regard to the attitude to 
lbe donted and the stens to be tcken in c ase of a renewal by 
Germrmy of an ao-gressive ....,olicy ; or ··rith regard to '"'nv 
situation constituting a danger to economic stabilitv. 
ARTICLli~ VIII 
In Jursuance of their determination to settle dis·outes 
only by 9eaceful means , the Hi~h Contracting Parties will 
a p_t.> ly to dis mtes betv,een themselves the folloFing nrovis ions: 
1'he High Contracting Parties will, while tl'le "'lr8sent 
Treaty remains in force, settle all disputes fBlling fithin 
the scope of Article 36, uarap,raph 2, of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice by referring them to the Court, 
subject only, in the case of each of them , to any reservation 
already made by thAt Party vhen accenting this clause for 
compulsory jurisdiction to the extent th.nt that Party Play 
maintain the reserv~tion . 
In addition, the Hi ,h Contracting rarties vrill submit 
I 
II 
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to conc~liation all disnutes outside the scope of Article 36, 
llpara~raph 2, of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice. 
In the case of a mixed dis·oute involving both question 
for which conciliation is ap0ropriate and other nuestions 
for which judicial settlement is aporopriate , any Party to 
1the dis0ute shall have the right to insist tha t the judicial 
settlement of the legal questions shall precede conciliation . 
The preceding provisions of this Article in no w2y 
affect the application of relevant nrovisions or agreements 
prescribing soMe other method of pqcific settlemAnt. 
I 'l'he High Contracting P9.rties mav, by aP"r~"ement, invite 
I any othP.r State to accede to the Drcsent Treaty on conditions 
to be F.creed between them and the State so invited. 
Any .St8te so invited may become a f'arty to the •rreAty 
by depositinF" an in<:Jtrn_ment of acceo"ion "'itr the :9elr-;ian 
C-rovernnent. 
The Belgian Government will inform each of the High 
Contracting PHrties of the deposit of each instru.'Tient of 
accession . 
ARTICLE X 
The present Treaty shall be ratified 8nd the 
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instruments of ratification hall be deposited as soon as 
pos~iblo ·rith the "lelgian Government . 
It shall enter into force on the date of the de osit o 
the l~ t instrument of ratific~tion and shall thereafter 
remDin in force for fifty rears . 
l-tfter the expiry of the neriod of fifty years, each of 
the Hi~h Contracting Parties shall have the ri ~ht to cease to 
be a party thereto provided that he shall have p reviously 
given one year ' s notice of denunciation to the Be l gian 
Government . 
The Bel-ian Goverrunent shall inform the Governments of 
the other High Contractinr Parties of the deposit of each 
instrument of rPtification and of each notice of denunciation . 
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In witness v1hereof , the above - mentioned Plenipotentiaries 
have si~ned the pr,sent Treaty and have affixed thereto their 
seals . 
Done at Brussels , this seventeenth day of M'lrch , 1948 , 
in English and .ttrench , each text being eoually authentic , in II 
a single copy which shall remain denosited in the qrc-hives of 
the Delgian Government and of which certified co~ies shall be 
transmitted by that Government to each of the other 
signatories . 
APPENDI D 
THE VANDENBERG R'~SOLUTION1 
fuereas neace with justice and the defense of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms require international 
cooneration through more effective use of the United Nations : 
'fherefore be it 
Resolved , That the Senate r~a.ffirm the ·policy of the 
United States to achieve international peace and security 
through the United Nations so that armed force shall not be 
used except in the common interest , and thot the President be 
advised of the sense of the Senate that this Government , by 
constitutional process , should particularly nursue the 
following objectives v1i thin the United Nations Charter : 
(1) Voluntary agreement to remove the veto from 
all questions involving pacific settlements of international 
disputes and situations, and froro the admission of new 
members . 
(2) Progressive develoonent of regional and other 
collective arrangements for individual and collective self-
defense in accordance with the uurooses , Drinciples, and 
1senate Resolution 239 , 80th Congress , 2nd Session, 
June 11, 1948 . 
\ 112 . 
If 
II 
provisions of the Chc.rter . 
(3) Association of the United States , by constitu-
tional ,Jrocess , 1Hi th such regional and other collective 
arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-
! help and mutual aid , and as affect its national security . 
I (4) Contributing to the maintenance of neace by 
making clear its determination to exercise the rig-ht of 
individual or collective self- defense under Article 51 should 
any armed attack occur affecting its national security . 
(5) Haximum efforts to obtain agreements to r-rovide 
the United Na ti.ons ~"i th armed forces as nrovided by the 
C~arter, and to obtain agreement among member nations upon 
univers~l requlation and reduction of qrmaments under 
adequate and dependable guaranty ~gainst violation . 
(_§_) If necessary , after adequate effort tovmrd 
stren~thening the United Nations , review of the Ch2rter at an 
appropriate time by a General Conference called under 
rrticle 109 or by the General Assembly . 
113 . 
II 
APPENDIX E 
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY1 
PREAi iBLE 
~he Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the 
urposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations 
and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all 
!Governments. 
'l'hey are determined to safeguard the freedom, common 
'heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the 
;principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of 
law. 
They seek to uromote stability and well-being in the 
:North Atlantic area . 
They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective 
defence for the p reservation of peace and security. 
They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty. 
Article I 
The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of 
the United Nations , to settle any international disputes in 
,I 
I 
II 
I 
I 
1 nenartment of State, North Atlantic Treaty, Publicatidp 
3464, March, 1949. 
1which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a 
/manner that international peace and security and justice are 
II 
I 115 . 
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I 
not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations 
1from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent 
11wi th the purnoses of the United Nations . I 
Article II 
The Parties '~ill contribute towa rds the further 
developraent of peaceful and friendly international relations 
lby strengthening their free institutions , by bringing about a 
better understanding of the 9rinciples upon which these 
institutions are founded , and by promoting conditions of 
stability and well - being . They will seek to eliminate 
conflict in their international economi c policies and will 
encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them . 
Arti c le III 
In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of 
this Treaty , the Parties , separatelv and jointly, by means 
of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will 
jmaintain and develop their individual and collective capacity 
to resist armed attack . 
Article IV 
The Parties will consult together whenever, in the 
I' 
opinion of any of them, the territorial inte~rity , political 
indep endence or security of ~ny of the Parties is threatened . 
Article V 
~he Parties a r ree that an armed attack against one or 
more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered 
an attack a hainst them all and conse quently they ap.ree that , 
if such an armed attack occurs , each of them, in exercise of 
the riglLt of individual or collective self- defence reco~nised 
by ~rticle 51 of the Charter of the United Nations , ,Jill 
assist the Party or Parties so attacked by takina fort~ith , 
individually and in concert with the other Parties , such 
action as it dee~s neces ary , includin~ the use of armed 
1force , to restore a nd maintain the security of the ~orth 
Atla ntic ~rea . 
Any such armed attack and all measures t a ken as a 
result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security 
Council . uch measures shall be terminated when the Security 
Council has t aken the measures nece cary to restore and 
maintain international peace and security. 
Article VI 
For the purpose of Article 5 an armed attqck on one or 
more of the Parties is deemed to include an a rmed attack on 
ter·,itory of any of the Parties in Europ e or North 
l l . 
~erica, on the Algerian Departments of France , on the 
occupation forces of any Party in ~urope , on the isl~nds under 
lthe jur:.. sdi ction of any .!:'arty in the North At l anti c ".rea 
north of the TroJic of Cancer or on the vessels or aircra~t in 
this area. of any of the Parties . 
Article VII 
This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be inter-
preted as aflecting, in any way the rights and obli P.tions 
•under the Charter of the .l:'arties which are members of' the 
United 1Jations , or the primary resnonsibility of the :Security 
Council i'or the maintenance of i.nterna tional peace !=lnr'l 
security . 
Article VIII 
-::ach Party declares th"t none of the international 
enge.:ements now in force b<>t~•reen it clnd any otl er of the 
Parties or any third State is in conflict with the c~ovisions 
of this Treaty , !'l.nd undertPkes not to enter into any inter -
nation~l engagement in con~lict with this Treqty . 
Article IX 
'l'he Parties hereb-~ f'"ltPblish a Council, on wh.i~h e'lch 
jof them shall be renr~sented, to consider matt rs concerning 
the imDlementation of this '11reaty . The Council shPll be so 
I 117 . 
I 
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o rr niz2rl a to be a"ble to me""t uronmtly nt any time . ':'he 
Council shall set up such subsidiAry bodies as ma be 
necessary; in p·~rticular it shn.ll establish imr1edir>tel""' a 
Defence Committee which shall recommend measures for the 
imulementation of Articles 3 and 5 . 
Article X 
'fhe Parties may, be unanimous agreement, invite any 
other European State in a Josition to further the principles 
of this Treaty and to contribute to the 8ecurity of the 
Horth Atlantic Prea to accede to this Treaty . Any State so 
invited may become a Party to the Treaty be epositin~ its 
instrument of accession vfi th the GovPrTl1J1fmt of the United 
States of America . 
The Government of the United States of America will 
inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such 
in trument of accession . 
Article XI 
This Treaty shall be r tified and its ~revisions 
carried out by the P~rties in accordance with their 
1 resJective constitutionql rocesses . The instruments of 
ratification shall be deposited as soon s nossible with the 
Government of the United St tes of America , ~hich will 
notify ·111 the other siD'n'"'tories of e"'ch deposit . The Treaty 
I 
'shall 
it !'l.S 
enter into force betv·een the States whi ch have ratified 
soon as the ratifications of the majority of the 
si<Tnatories , includinp; the ratifications of BelP'iUY:'l , Cenada, 
!France, Luxem1,ourg, the Netherlands , the United Ki1w·dom and 
the United States, have been denosited and shall come into 
effect ~ith respect to other StatPs on the dqte of the dopo it 
of thei~ ratifications. 
II Article XII 
I 
After the Treaty has been in force for ten years , or 
at any time thereafter, the Parties shall , if any of them so 
re quests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the 
Treaty, having regard for the factors then cd'fecting peace 
and ser:!Urity in the North Atlantic a~ea, including the 
development of universal as ~ell as regional arransements undeir 
l the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of 
internqtional ~eqce and security . 
Article XIII 
After the Treaty has been in force for twenty vears , 
1 a ny Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice 
of denunciation has been 
! states of America, which 
II 
given to the Govern~ent of the Unite1 
will inform the Governments of the II 
other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation . 
119 . 
120 . 
Article XIV 
'I'his 'l'reaty, of which the Enr.;lish and French texts are , 
equally authentic , shall be deposited in the archives of the 
Government of the United 0tates of America . Duly certified 
conies thereof will be transmitted by that Government to the 
1foverlli~ents of the other signatories . 
1 In witness whereof , the undersi gned Pleninotentiaries 
have si!Sned this Trea ty . 
Done at Vlashinr;ton , the -fourth day of April, 19Ll9 . 
APPF.NDIX F 
TR~ ATY OF DUNKIRK1 
A treaty of alliance and mutual assistance between the 
United Kinr-;dom of Great Bri tain and Northern Ireland and t:1.e 
President of the French Renublic s i gned at Dunkirk , March 4th, 
1947. II 
....... ............................................... " ...... . 
Article I 
/ithout nre judice to any arrangements that may be 
1 made , under any 'rrea ty concl uded between a ll the Powers havin&i 
responsibility for action in relation to Germany under 
Article 107 of the Charter of the United Nations , for the 
!purpose of preventing any infrinP.;ements by Germany of her 
obligations with regard to disarma.ment and de - mili tarisation 
and generally of ensuring thPt Germany shall not again become 
a menace to peace, the High Contractinp Parties will , in the 
event of any threat to the security of either of them arising I 
from the adoption by Germany of a policy of aggrAssion or from 
I 1Sir W, Eric Beckett , The Nor~ Atlantic Treaty The 
Brussels 'l'reaty and 'rhe Charter of the United Nations 
!(London: Stevens & Sons , Limited, 1950.) p . 48 . 
·I 
I 
J 
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action by Germany designed t o facilitate such a policy, take , 
I after consulting with each other and where appropriate \Vi th 
the other Po~ers having responsibility for action in relation 
to Germany , such agreed action (which so long as the said 
Article 107 remains operative shall be action under that 
Article ) as is best calculated to DUt an end to this threat . 
Article II 
Should either of the High Contracting Parties become 
a ain involved in hostilities with Germ8ny , 
either in consequence of an armed attack , within the 
! meaning of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations , 
by Germany against tha t Party , 
or as a result of agreed action taken against Germany 
I under Article I of this Treaty , 
I or as a result of enforcement action taken against 
Germany by the United Nations Security Council , 
the other High Contracting Party will at once qive the 
1Iigh Contracting Party so involved in hostilities all the 
military and other support and assistance in his nower • 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Article V 
(1 ) Uothing in the present Treaty should be inter-
ureted s dero~ating in any way from the obli(l'ations devolving 
l ~2 . 
---~--=-=======!1=1 =1.23 ·= 
upon the High Contracting f8rties from the provisions of the 
Charter of the United N.:> tions or from any Sl1e cial agreements 
concluded in virtuP of Article 43 of the Ch~rter. 
(2) Neither of the High Contr!'lcting Parties 'Till 
c~nclude any alliance or tale p~rt in anv coslition directed 
a ·ainst the other High Contracting Party ; nor vill they enter 
into any obliJ2;ation inconsistent with the ryrovisions of the 
present IJ.'reaty • 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
APPENDIX G 
EXCERPTS FRO!/~ IN'I'ER- AI,"ERICAN TR~ATY OF 
RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE (RIO PACT )l 
In the name of their Peoples , the Gover1nnents 
re :Jresented at the Inter - Amer ican Conference for the Maintena:qce 
of Continental feace and Security , desirous of consolidating 
and stl'engthening their relations of friendship and P"ood 
,lnei p;hborliness , and 
CO"-SI ERING : 
That the High Contracting Powers reiterate their will 
to remain united in an inter- American system consistent with 
the purposes and ,Jrinciples of the United Nations , and 
reaffirm the existence of the agreement which they have 
concluded concerning those matters relating to the maintenanc~ 
of international Deace and secu ·, i ty which are aPDropriate for 
regional action ; 
••••••• It ••••••••• • •••• • • • ••••••••••••••••••••• • ••••••••••••••• 
r1'h<>t the oblir.:ation of mutual assistance and common 
defense of the American Republics is essentially rel2.ted to 
j their democratic ideals and to their will to cooPerate 
oermanently in the fulfillment of the principles and purPoses 
1 Department of State , 
II 
124 . 
of a uolicy of neace : 
~Chat the American re'!ional corrmuni t'T affirms s a 
manifest truth that juridical organization is a necessary 
')rereou-Lsite of security and pea ce , and that peace is founded 
on justi ce and moral order and , consequent l y , on the inter-
national re cognition and prote c tion of human rights and 
1
rreedoms , on the indis0ensabl e well-being of the people , and 
on the effectiveness of democracy for the interna~ional 
realization of justi ce and security , 
Have resolved , i n conformi t y with the objectives 
stated above , to conclude the following Treaty , in order to 
assure peace , through adequate means , to provide for effective 
recinrocal assistance to meet armed attacks against any 
~ Ameri can State , and in order to deal with threats of agrr,ression 
against any of them : 
Article I 
'.rhe rligh Contracting f'arties formally condemn war and 
!undertake in their international re l ations not to resort to 
the threat or the use of force in any manner inconsistent 
lith the ')revisions of the Ch'lrter of the United Nations or 
liar this •rrea ty . 
II 
I 
I 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • I 
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Article III 
1. 'l'he lligh Contrncting arties a ree thRt an armed 
attack by any State a~ainst an American State shall be 
considered as an attqck against all the American States and , 
conser~cntly , each one of the said Co~tractin~ Parties 
undertakes to assist in meeting the atte.ck in the exercise 
of the :nherent right of individual or collective self-defense 
recognized by rticle 51 of the Charter of the United +- • 8 lOllS . 
2 . On the reau~st of the State or States directly 
attacked and until the decision of the or~an of Consultation 
of the Inter- American System, each one of the Contractin / 
~arties may determine the immediate measures hich it may 
individue.lly ta e in fulfillment of the oblir.ation contained 
in the orededinr; pararraph and in accordance 11i th the 
orinciole of continental solidarity . The Orrr~n of Consultation 
shall meet ·ithout dolqy for the nur ose of ex~mininr those 
measures and Rfrceing u on the measures of a cell ctive 
char· ct .::r th::..t should be taken . 
Tho nrovisions of this Article shall be " lied in 
case of any armed attack v7hich takes place :ithin the reP"ion 
described in Article 4 or within the territory of an American 
I 
State . fuen the attack takes ~lace outside of the said areas , 
lthe provisions of Article 6 shall be anplied • 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
may be taken until t~ Security Conn,.,il of the U0ited 
:~£ t., • o11s h: s tal<en t e me.,sures necess ry to maint,in 
international peace n security • 
• • • • • • • ·t ••••• • •••••••••••• • •• • ••• • •••• • ••••••••••••••• • • ••• ••• 
Article V 
~he High Contracting a ties shall in~'ediately send to 
the S,., ~1 ri ty Council of' i-he United fl tio .-;, in conr,n Tl'li t 
Articles 51 and 54 of the C art r of the United h~tions , 
comnletc information concerninr. t e ~ctivitie undP. ~ en or 
contPm ..... la .... ion in the exerc.L:Je of the ri ht of self- d~"f'ense 
or for the urnose of maintaining inter- Arnericnn )eace and 
security . 
Article VI 
If the inviol . Dility or the inte~~ity of' the territory 
or the sovereignty or Doliti c 8l ind .pendence of any Merican 
State hould be a,f'ected by an agg:re 8io n which is not an 
1
armed att ck or bv n extra- continent~ l or intrR- continent 1 
co!!flict , or by any other fact or situation thPt mir;ht 
endqn .er the peqce of Americ , the Or an of Conqultation sh 1] 
meet immediately in order to a ree on the !'1 . S'1rPs wh:tch nust 
1be taken in c~9e of a~ - re8sion ton ~ist the v ictim of the 
la,,..,.I·ession or , in any c 'lsP. , the Measures '"Ihich hould be taken 
for the common defense and for t' e :m-"lintenance of the peace 
1~7 . 
I' 
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and security of the Continent • 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Article IX 
In addition to other acts v1hi ch the Organ of 
Consultation may characterize as agrrression , the following 
shall be considered as such : 
a . Unnrovoked armed attack by a State r:>. ain9t the 
territory, the people , or the lPnd , sea or air forces of 
another State; 
b . Invasion, by the armed forces of a StRte, of the 
' territory of an American State , throu~h the trespassin? of 
boundaries demarcated in accordance with a treaty, judicial 
decision , or arbitral award , or , in the absence of frontiers 
thus demf:lrcated , invasion affecting a region which is under 
the efl'ective jurisdiction of another State . 
Article X 
None of the ~revisions of this Treaty shall be 
construed as i~pairing the ri~hts and obliiTations of the 
High Contracting Parties under the Charter of the United 
Nations • 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
APPENDIX H 
THE SOVIET ALLIANCE SYSTEM, 1942-19491 
Soviet-Czechoslovak: December 12, 1943 
Soviet-Yugoslav: April 11, 1945 
Soviet- Polish : Anril 21 , 1945 
Sino-Soviet : Auaust 14, 1945 
Soviet-Rumanian: February 4 , 1948 
Soviet- Hungarian : February 18, 1948 
Soviet- Bulgarian: March 18, 1948 
3oviet-1l1inn.ish: April 6 , 1948 
MUTUAL ASSISTANCE PACTS VJI'rHIN rrHE SYSTEM 
Yugoslav-Polish: March 18, 1946 
Yugoslav-C zechoslovak : May 9, 1946 
Yugoslav- Albanian : July 9, l94n 
Czechoslovak-Polish: March 10, 1947 
Yugoslav- Bulgarian : November 27, 1947 
Yu~oslav-Hungarian: December 8 , 1947 
Bulgarian- Albanian : December 16, 1947 
Yugoslav- Rumanian : December 19, 1947 
rlulgarian- Rumanian: J'-'l.nU ry 16, 1948 
l Department of State , Documents and State l'aoers, 
Vol. I, .tJo . 4, July 1948, pp . 219 - 227 and Nos . 12-13, Larch-
Auril 1949, pp . 681-684 . 
II 
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Hun arian- RumaniRn: J nuary ?1 , 1948 
Bulgarian- Cz8choslovak: Auril 23 , 1948 
Polish- Bulgarian: May 29, 1948 
Polish-Hungarian: June 18, 1948 
Hungarian- Bulgari n: July 16 , 1948 
Czechoslovak- Rumanian : July 21 , 1948 
Po1ish- Rumanian: January 26, 1949 
Czechoslovak-Hung~rian: ril 16, 1949 
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A-- A >-iST.:11 CT OF A 'J'tillSI S 
_tis a ver·y difficult task to c:ay v:hrt the orth 
At;l"ntic act vill f'i .c>.ll mean bncaT"l"" it ···ill ch n; e with 
1cx erience and circumstancrs . lt this stare t~is ~iant is 
still in t'_e proc8SS of being; nnurish""d A.nc, in the dormant 
sta e . ~o-ever , it ~ill have a distinct influencP in t~e 
lei vilization in ·enernl and to its j ";D tories in F~rt.;cnlnr . 
~rhe nat~::>ns ;hich have ado .... ted the act ·vill havp to sacrifice 
'their ad itional national rnan.o7er , r93ources nd re"lth . It 
~n1.,y- crer te rn international ... ea ce or ar , •v1·10 can answPr? Onl 
'.'ill tell . 
It is certain that the ract has alr ady c~ntr1 uted 
r ~tly to the cooJeration and undcrRtrndin. a ong nations 
is so vital in t~is prnsent day orld ~ith its pro lems . 
J.'he orth tl".nti c J~"' ct ··:ouJ d nean th · sh ring of 
lt,ec1no~ ical ro r ss amon the n-=-tions ··hich is iP'lJOrt nt in 
d~Velo in ulB St n?a~dq Of liVin~ Of the PntirE' Orld. 
he Pact h• s si ni 'icn:ntl cant •i ut d "S7cl ol "'i ,'"\l 
\'3-Tid 1 or 1 "'dvrnt'1 0s n!"Jon, tl}c 11 fr0e" p o l'-'s of t11"' 'I rld and 
those living; ochind the 'Iron Curtrl:i.n . 11 Above 'lll , it is a 
check on ar-.~ression . 
he rimar· a ln of the student in th"' the sis '"as to 
consider the orth _t;lqntic ~act from the point of vin of a 
~ilitary alliance and its place in th0 ~ower politics in the 
ni t.ed r t ions . 
1lJ.ere '":ll'"" not many bool's vot ;rri tten on the subject 
ii 
ov:·ever, n.ll I 
tho subje c~ 
rimaril; due to the newness ,f th~ ~qc~ . 
ossiolc docU1n0~1ts .L~ron the D ... t-Jartment of 3tate on 
tter ·:ere secured and further sources '3re t~l-en "'-rorr 
per1o~~cals ~nd neuspqpers . 
0n April 4, 1949 the ~orth tlPntic ~act w s signed . 
~hus, ~ e U~ited States moved from its isolationist policy to 
intern~tionalism . 
he ~ o-nth A tl ... nti c 1 o.-::;t '''auld have never come into 
exist8nce . rovided U3Sia had coopera tAd in the United r• tion 
'urther, the ~act is under the Articl~s of th0 Ch1=1rter of the 
Jni ted -... tions al thour,h no one !J.qd ever i:r 'l ined thr->.t such a 
VEst and powerful alliance could be :'armed under the provi9ion's 
of the united l..=ti ons. 
The main pur_..~ose of the Korth Atlantic l:act is 
de ·ensive . Only the a..c;grcssor h:::s to be afraid of the allian e . 
It ~rovides coooeration runong the signrtories in political , 
economical and military fields and an attack on one or more 
parties of the Pact is to be considered an atta clr on oll the 
signatories . 
It is not possible to clet""rmin'" at this sta ,A ·vhether 
the .l:'8 ct ',rould lead to ·mr or ,lOP. ce. It "~;Jill l '3T -.,.. ly dr;pend 
u ... on the circlilnstances above al l , 'lhe ract still is an infant 
and in the nourishing sta e , men this ~iant ac~ieves its 
full grow·th, and if then provoked , it ·ill 1 ring ,·ar but then 
iil 
by the s~me token it m&y avert a c&tastropha . 
'l'he U. S . S . R . and its satellites alonp; with their 
backers have e;i ven r1any argw'lr;nts R..{1"H.ins t the act . Hovrov~r , 
it was their action in Czechoslovakia and iti thin the "Iron 
Curtain' plus their non- cooperation in the United ations 
!Which made the l~orth Atl, ntic .Pnct countries suspicious of 
their ideas . 
'l'he !orth Atl"ntic Pact countries, qfter s"'ein~ and 
'experiencing the a1-:ove mn tt.ers , 'lere n.l:_:>_rmed and ':/ere 
determined to preserve institutions nd ·:·ays of l:ife . 
I rl'herefore , under the ci.rcums tancCJ s , the ans"·er vms in forming 
such an alliance that would discotlT'age f:md ·rarn any a·-r:ressor 
that an attack on one would be met ' i th the ovorwhr-L'ling fore 
I of all . 
'I'he North Atlr1ntic Pact came into existence in ?r'l.dual 
I 
steps particularly from the Euro_ean brckground and especiall 
after the formation of '1'he Brussels 'l'reaty . 
l'he Harth fl. tlanti c act coYJ.si s ts of fourteen :;rti cles 
which aro explained in Chr.~pter VI . These articles state that 
lthe signatories believe in the United ~ations ChRrt~r . 
I One of the main ideas of the ¥Pet is the procurement 
of arms . So far , n:Jthing has been "'eared to determine hovf 
the r,rms shall be (Jj_ s t:c"i bu ted ":monp; the si.c:m 001 tories . P"o•:rev~r 
it is ~1-;~P that the United States rill have to shoulder the 
major bu.,.,den of supplyin~ the 2rms "lnd mnmuni tion which ·nill 
iv 
cost t~e Jnited StatPs billions of dollaT's . 
or.c people believe that the ansv1er ~or peace is in 
uttAr , not guns and further , the a~t 'muld enc~1ra e usia 
in keeJ_Jing it prepared fully to meet the i pact of this 
~-lli ance . 'l'hus , two rival camps for an armaments r·a ce would 
e for·med and inevitably one day the cl ~ sh bAt ·•een these 
tv,o camJs ·:.rould occur . 
1t urther , there are Many other ir.11)0:c"tant questions 
1thich r·emain to be answered such as the colonial probl ns , 
~xch"'nge of material and further alliances , ~tlong "lith scor8s 
f items th9t rre not discussed here . 
One thing is s e and th2. t is that in case of Jar .ri th 1 
.ussia the signatoriqs ~11 be in a bettor position strategically 
o attHck Russia due to the str~te~ic positions th~~t come undev 
he .Los"'e ::;ion o: the lorth Atll"lntic .t'act count!'ies . 
I ~he bqsic Rin of the signatoriqs is certainly ORCA and 
I 
tne preservation of its in1titutions . IIo·;ev"'r , the n· tions 
ltnow that unpreparedness ;·ill _ eril them all . 'iherei'ore , in 
rd r to meet and cope ~ri th any -::tggressor the , orth tlanti c 
act \las cr·eated. . 
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